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ABSTRACT
Finding Equilibrium on the Internet: How Chinese Netizens and the Regime
Navigate Social Media Censorship
(Under the direction of Dr. Weixing Chen)
China’s current social media landscape consists of the most users in the world
operating within the most extensive governmental censorship apparatus in the world,
which over time has created a shaky balance between personal expression and
institutional order. This thesis attempts to shed light on an understudied, potentially
sensitive topic by exploring the multifaceted relationship between Chinese Internet users
and the communist regime in terms of content surveillance. By examining the current
Internet environment, assessing the opportunities and challenges the web provides users
and the regime, implementing a survey with sixteen Chinese netizens, and conducting a
literature review, this thesis posits that the previously described current balance works
because of the state’s centuries-long history with censorship and the general support of
regulation from Internet users. After expounding upon these topics, this thesis finds that
the rising influence of Chinese netizens may result in a detrimental shift in the balance
between expression and order, in which censorship should eventually diminish.
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
Deng Xiaoping, an influential leader within the Chinese Communist Party for
decades, articulated that “If you leave a window open for fresh air, you have to expect
some flies to come in,” meaning negative consequences will inevitably result from
uncontrolled expression (Minzner, 2014). Though censorship has been a longstanding
component of China’s history largely due to the regime’s appetency for centralized
authority, the more recent introductions of Internet and social media into society have
diversified the ways in which content regulation exists and affects individuals and
organizations.
This research explores the increasingly complex relationship between Chinese
netizens and social media censorship that stems from the current communist regime. By
examining existing literature and conducting primary research, this thesis will posit that
today’s Chinese Internet users and the communist regime have struck a balance between
expression and control that renders censorship largely advantageous for society. This
statement will be defended based upon the grounds that censorship is historically rooted
in Chinese culture to the point in which Internet users would rather have some content
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regulation than none. The thesis will furthermore assert that, even though the idea behind
China’s world-class censorship apparatus could be exemplary for other countries, the
current equilibrium maintains that the justification of social media censorship should not
be permanent.
This thesis will open with an analysis of the current social media landscape in
China, first discussing the trends of Chinese Internet users and then digging into three of
the nation’s leading social media platforms that have significantly impacted the way
millions communicate. In order to explore the dual nature of the Internet, the proceeding
part will discuss a sample of the opportunities and challenges that the Internet bestows
upon Internet users, followed by a section on some of the opportunities and challenges
the web provides the communist regime. The major arguments of this thesis with
supporting rationale in the forms of secondary research and primary surveys will then be
presented. Following the arguments, this thesis will include a literature review that
explains findings and theories of scholars on the topics of social media censorship and
relations between netizens and the regime. In the concluding section, an overall
assessment of the research will be provided.
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PART TWO: THE CURRENT CHINESE INTERNET LANDSCAPE
The term ‘netizen’ is often used by individuals, companies, and the regime to
describe a Chinese citizen who accesses the Internet. Some Chinese citizens also perceive
the meaning of this term to embody one who actively advocates for freedom of speech in
cyberspace, thus using the Internet as a means of independent self-expression in the midst
of authoritarian governance. As a result, some individuals use this term to translate into a
form of pride, while others use it literally, and still others will not use it at all. Regardless
of the term’s connotation, the number of Internet users in China has skyrocketed since its
1987 introduction as an email tool for a handful of scholars (Tai, 2012, p. 122).
Netizen demographics over the past twenty years reveal that the Internet has
become increasingly inclusive within Chinese society. In 2000, men dominated 79% of
the Internet landscape; however, this online gender gap decreased significantly by 2009,
in which male users comprised 53% of cyberspace and women totalled 47% (Chi, 2012).
Furthermore, 84% of netizens in 2000 either attended junior college or a four-year
university, but by 2009, almost 75% of Internet users possessed educations at the high
school level or below. In 2009, however, a digital divide of 71.7% urban users as
opposed to 28.3% rural users was evident across netizens, which is a trend that still exists
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to a much smaller degree. According to the same source, in 2000 and 2009 alike, around
16% of Internet users were ages forty and older.
Data from the past five years alone reveals that the Internet is still mostly
common among young, educated adults, as access to the Internet in rural areas and in
schools expands (China, 2018). Statistics from January 2012 reveal that China boasted
around 500 million netizens, which equates to almost 40 percent of the nation’s
population at this time (China, 2018). Predominant users in 2012 were young males,
young adults, and high school graduates who access the Internet from mobile devices or
desktops. Six years later in August 2018, the number of active Chinese netizens had
surpassed 800 million, which accounts for almost 58% of the country’s population,
making it the world’s largest Internet user powerhouse (McCarthy, 2018). Not only does
China have the biggest Internet base, but it also exemplifies the most active one, with
91% of online users also having social media accounts, in contrast to 67% of Internet
users in the United States (Wang, 2016). This trend may be due to the fact that 98% of
China’s netizens access the Internet from a mobile device, from where today’s online
accounts are mostly utilized (McCarthy, 2018).
Starting with electronic bulletin board systems (BBS) like sina.com and
sohu.com, cyberspace has paved the way for social media platforms that allow
individuals, organizations, and businesses to be connected with ease and efficiency (Ye,
Xu, & Zhang, 2017). According to Ye et al., such basic chatting software was initially
used at universities, starting in the late 1990s, and gradually expanded to social groups,
which has paved the way for today’s more complex sites that allow photos, blogging,
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status updates, music, news, and videos. The same authors assert that social platforms
with these functions, such as WeChat, QQ, and Weibo, have grown to create a public
sphere, in which “people can exchange ideas freely through meetings, debates, dialogues
and discussions” that encourage two-way conversations and exploration of questions (Ye,
et al., 2017, p. 8). The advances in Internet and social media thus allow Chinese netizens
to contribute to and be members of an even greater shared culture, in which any
individual with Internet access can participate.
The purposes of using social media platforms are relatively the same worldwide;
for example, Chinese netizens want to build social and professional interconnectivity, or
guanxi, just as users outside of China want to create networks and relationships. Users in
China desire to “gain face,” or increase a positive viewpoint of oneself through social
media, which is similar to the broad netizen drive to gain followers and likes (Wang,
2016, p. 45). An analysis of the distinct domestic platforms WeChat, QQ, and Sina
Weibo will demonstrate how netizens in China effectively exercise their free speech and
expression within the parameters enforced by the regime.
WeChat, originally called “Weixin,” is a comprehensive service created by the
media corporation Tencent, in which users can text, call, send voice messages, share
videos and multimedia, read articles, exchange money, order food, and even call taxis
through one common application (Wang, 2016). Its 2011 launch attracted Internet users
in droves, as the platform allowed individuals to send instant messages free of the
charges that are imposed by the state-owned cell phone corporation (Chen, 2018). This
platform grew astronomically, totalling 50 million users before the end of its first year
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(Chen, 2018). As of 2019, there are over one billion WeChat accounts in China, as users
have the ability to create multiple accounts (Yuan, 2019, para. 2), thus quickly proving
itself to be the most popular messaging application in the Asia-Pacific region (Wang,
2016). Though this platform expands across China, WeChat is usually used by urban,
young adults with relatively higher levels of education, as individuals aged eighteen to
thirty-five comprise around 85% of its total user base (Wang, 2016). There are a number
of factors that led to its rapid success among Chinese netizens and beyond its borders.
As previously mentioned, WeChat dominated the social media scene within years,
which is largely because the application is smartphone-based. Tencent recognized the
potential for WeChat to flourish as smartphones began expanding to wider audiences in
China; as a result, the application was created to intentionally grow proportionally with
the influx of smartphones. Many other applications were based on desktops--including
QQ, which will be discussed later in this section--so these companies had to allocate
time, funds, and employees to meet demands of the growing smartphone market, which
WeChat skipped altogether by launching directly on a mobile platform (Wang, 2016).
WeChat grew in popularity not only because it is smartphone-based, but because
it also employs a function uncommon to Chinese netizens: voice messaging. In 2015,
almost 85% of its netizens used WeChat specifically for this function, which grew
especially among the elderly, disabled, illiterate, semi-illiterate, and foreign populations
who may have difficulty expressing themselves in Mandarin (Wang, 2016). This
innovation that was made easily available to the public did not come with unanimous
support, with some saying it is only appropriate in intimate relationships, others saying it
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is downright disturbing, and yet others saying it improves their oratory skills (Wang,
2016). Nevertheless, this function provided the platform a larger user base, as WeChat
users totaled around 280 million recorded minutes by 2015 (Wang, 2016). Because
WeChat offers many personalized ways to communicate and share money, it also
possesses higher privacy and a low degree of anonymity in which real names and the
desire to be professional are much more common on WeChat than on other accounts.
In addition to the structure for smartphones and the unique features for including
netizens, WeChat is widely attractive because it is visually oriented. In 2012, more
features were added to the platform so users could share photos within a Moments
category, which is similar to Facebook’s timeline, as well as in a Photo Album (Chen,
2018). While using the Moments feature, netizens can publicize up to nine photos at a
time to an unlimited amount of people, to which recipients of this data can respond with
links or comments (Chen, 2018). Typically, a sender has to post a photo before a text box
pops up to create personal content, so images are widely circulated on this platform,
much like the Western applications Instagram or Tumblr. Though updates were created in
which users can select a pure text option, thereby opting out of uploading a photo or
video and posting only words, very few people use this function or are even aware of its
existence. Communicating such visually-oriented information through the Moments and
Photo Album features allows individual netizens to send messages to a limitless amount
of people, but the messages must be specifically accepted by the sender (Chen, 2018).
Netizens are also drawn to WeChat because it operates within a closed
community, in which information can be transferred from an individual to a small group
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where there is greater trust and familiarity (Chen, 2018). For example, to add a friend, it
is necessary to scan a QR code, enter in someone’s personalized and permanent WeChat
ID, or utilize a phone number. WeChat users can also stimulate discussion through the
formation of group chats. The size of these chats are limited by Tencent, initially starting
out at a maximum of forty people, but these sizes had expanded to a maximum of 500
members by 2016 (Chen, 2018). Through the formation of these chats, netizens are able
to unite “to organize and coordinate close-knit group activities that could address issues
of great community concern,” such as shaping policies or advocating for civic
engagement (Chen, 2018, p. 80). Though there are options in which users can arbitrarily
add others based on different parameters—adding nearby users, shaking a device and
connecting with someone around the world who is shaking his or her device
simultaneously, or sending a “message in a bottle” to someone at random--many people
realistically use this application to connect with family, friends, and colleagues (Wang,
2016).
Because of WeChat’s unparalleled consolidation of functions and features, this
application has become irreplaceable in the lives of Chinese netizens. Over one-third of
WeChat users spend at least four hours a day accessing the platform, which penetrates
deeply into their private and professional lives to the point where other forms of
interpersonal connection are no longer needed (Yuan, 2019). For example, a technology
columnist based in Hong Kong writes that business meetings in China often have “a time
when everybody takes out his or her phone and scans the WeChat QR codes of others to
become friends,” which has rendered traditional forms of corporate communication, like
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email or business cards, almost obsolete (Yuan, 2019, para. 9). Similarly, the platform’s
widespread utilization of and adaptation to QR codes allowed Tencent to annex mobile
payment methods, which simplifies purchasing experiences for netizens and reduces the
need for traditional forms of payment, like cash or cards. As a result of WeChat’s
infiltration into the daily lives of Chinese netizens to make their work and play easier, the
platform is not likely to lose any traction with its stakeholders in the near future.
Another social media powerhouse in China is QQ, a personal networking platform
also owned by Tencent. Known for its logo displaying a winking penguin wearing a red
scarf, this platform is often related to WhatsApp or Facebook Messenger, in which users
can update statuses, write blogs, make payments, and share photographs, stickers, music,
and videos with online contacts. In contrast to those who routinely access WeChat, QQ’s
user base consists of a higher number of rural residents, since it does not require a phone
number to register (Wang, 2016). Also unlike WeChat, QQ was initially created for
desktop computers because it was developed alongside the rise of Internet to be released
in 1999 (Tencent, 2019). Though the application was eventually transferred to mobile
devices with the influx of the smartphone market, desktops allow QQ netizens to fully
engage in the customization that brings many users to the platform. QQ boasts 861
million monthly users that account for its ability to adapt to cultural demands and
changes (Tencent, 2019).
The customization that exists on QQ is an enormous component of Asia-Pacific
social media culture (Wang, 2016). On this platform, netizens can create their own
avatars, categorize their contact lists, and personalize web page models, background
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pictures, and music, much like Western MySpace (Tencent, 2019). As a result of these
netizens’ desire to customize and create more colorful, rich visuals and profile layouts,
QQ demonstrates a high degree of anonymity within netizens’ usernames and
photographs. For example, about 95% of QQ netizens do not use their real names but
choose to substitute them for phrases, and some do not use a picture of themselves
(Wang, 2016). However, regardless of how many times a user customizes his or her
profile, every user has a QQ number that never changes and serves to identify and add
friends.
Since it was released twenty years ago, QQ employs a convergence culture in
which many of its services were the first exposure Chinese netizens experienced to
navigating various aspects of the Web. As one of the first widely-used media platforms,
scholars assert that “QQ is the starting point of many people in China and their digital
life,” whether that be instant messaging, sharing and displaying music programs,
accessing gaming channels, and even utilizing shopping forums (Wang, 2016, p. 29). In
2004, a hierarchical structure was launched in which the longer QQ users stayed logged
into their accounts accessing any of these networking mechanisms, the higher the ranking
users could earn (Wang, 2016). Since netizens want to gain face and see themselves in
the most positive light possible, QQ users would stay online for hours a day and develop
addictive habits that would limit their productivity. To combat this issue, QQ changed its
policy to where users to where two hours of engagement a day counts as an active
member. Despite these policy changes, QQ members utilize this platform to exert
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creativity and potentially as an outlet to defy rules and boundaries of everyday life
(Wang, 2016).
A third example of the social media platforms dominating Chinese cyberspace is
Sina Weibo, a personal publication site that is commonly related to Western Twitter.
Many of Twitter’s same characteristics apply to Sina Weibo, such as using “@” to tag
someone, typing “#” to create a hashtag, and posting a maximum number of characters
that can be published to an infinite audience (Wang, 2016). This platform is widely used
by rural residents who must span distances to effectively communicate, as well as
celebrities who desire to contact large audiences or even netizens that they do not know
personally. As previously discussed, this type of social media has been termed
“microblogging,” which is a label that is commonly under debate since platforms made
solely for blogging, like Western Blogger and WordPress, have been banned entirely
within China’s borders.
Though WeChat certainly allows netizens to generate conversations on political
or social issues among friends or fellow group members, Weibo provides a better
platform for open debate among a much larger, less personal audience. For example,
virtually anyone on Weibo can read and respond to posts, whereas comments on WeChat
public and personal accounts are only shared with the original poster and, consequently,
are much more private (Chen, 2018). Furthermore, unlike WeChat, Weibo lists the
number of followers each user possesses, thus insinuating whom Internet users should
follow, admire, and heed. By distinguishing this information, Weibo effectively gives the
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more popular, influential opinion leaders a louder voice, as opposed to ordinary netizens
with fewer followers (Chen, 2018).
Despite the opportunities Weibo presents as a public network that stimulates
broad conversations, users of this platform are on the decline. Reasons for this decline
include the governmental efforts like censorship that push against microblogging, and the
influx of advertisements on the site, and the shift toward communication among close
groups (Chen, 2018). After Sina Weibo became a subject of attempts to “clean up” the
Internet starting in 2013, people can be jailed for spreading online rumors varying
proportionally with how many times the content has been viewed, as previously
discussed in this thesis. Since circulation of content on this application is extremely easy,
many users do not want to take the risk of incarceration on personal publication platforms
Sina Weibo (Wang, 2016, p. 52). Another factor that deters netizens from using Sina
Weibo is the difficulty to build guanxi, in that communication on this platform links
strangers. Since platforms like WeChat and QQ encourage creating contacts with those in
one’s area of study, family, or social circles, netizens tend to shift from Sina Weibo to
either of the former platforms where tight-knit relationships are cultivated and
encouraged.
The rapid success of these platforms and the companies that produce them has not
escaped the attention of the regime. Not only have various methodologies of censorship
been implemented on these sites, which will be discussed in a following section, but the
government also proposed the idea of purchasing “special management shares” in some
of the country’s top communication firms in 2016 to further exert its influence (Yuan,
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2017, para. 21). The concept of special management shares would offer a 1% government
stake contingent upon representation on the boards and panels of social media firms to
further review content (Zhong & Wee, 2017). While 1% seems like a small number,
media moguls like Tencent and Weibo accrue hundreds of billions of dollars in market
capitalization annually, so this stake in Tencent alone would cost over $4 billion (Yuan,
2017). This plan has been met with mixed reviews, as some companies believed it would
ultimately fade from the government’s agenda (Yuan, 2017). However, as smaller
communication companies such as Tiexue and Zaker have offered stakes in accordance
with this plan, other opinions hold that this type of government-sponsored deal “is a sign
of things to come” in the future of social media and government relations (Zhong & Wee,
2017, para. 4).
An analysis of WeChat, QQ, and Sina Weibo reveals that Chinese netizens are
able to perform a variety of functions that tie them to their respective social circles purely
through utilizing domestic platforms. The universal communicative functions found on
these platforms, such as the abilities to post status updates, add friends, and share photos
or videos, allow users to express themselves in a number of ways and to build
much-desired guanxi with other Chinese netizens. Though some Western outlets are
blocked in their entirety, Chinese Internet users hardly access these platforms unless they
travel abroad or purchase a virtual private network because the plethora of domestic
platforms provides guanxi in ways superior to international platforms. Not only do
millions more Chinese citizens access domestic platforms than those of Western descent
to achieve the notion of guanxi, but the Chinese platforms often provide a greater level of
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function versatility and integration--such as the ability to pay for a meal, send a voice
recording, or call a taxi all in one application--in which international platforms
increasingly often use as a model. Though mainstream scholarship often asserts that the
censorship of entire social media platforms is an infringement of netizens’ expression,
netizens are able to effectively express their viewpoints and opinions through emerging
techniques on hundreds of domestic social media sites.
However, the rise of an engaged citizenship operating under the governance of an
authoritative regime creates a push and pull force between netizens’ freedom of
expression and the party’s desire to remain in control. With such rapid and widespread
growth in the technology sector, the party has increased its role in regulating content on
all levels of government to the point in which “there has been a reluctance to
acknowledge the crucial role played by the central government, and also by local
bureaucrats” in regards to censorship (Wang, 2016, p. 27). The Chinese Communist
Party, Internet service providers, and netizens thus have a complex, multifaceted
relationship in which freedom of online speech often falls into gray area, as the state and
Internet providers are seeking their own interests while trying to balance the demands of
their stakeholders (Han, 2018). The rise of the Internet in China has inspired collective
mobilization and criticism of the regime, to which the government has adapted and
developed regulatory apparatuses in an attempt to match the creativity and pluralization
of netizens (Han, 2018). Consequently, the Internet has caused various opportunities and
challenges for netizens in its roughly three decades of existence in China, which will be
detailed in the next section.
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PART THREE: THE INTERNET’S OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR
NETIZENS
The Internet in China presents itself as a double-edged sword, in which its rapid
and widespread development both benefits and sometimes detriments those who utilize it.
For example, the expansion of Internet undeniably brings advancements through
efficiency and ease to the hundreds of thousands of users who communicate with one
other, conduct complex research and exchange findings, and buy, sell, and trade products
or services, among other functions. However, the freedom of online expression in a
communist regime is inevitably met with regulations and limitations that assert the
government’s authority and, consequently, bring various challenges to netizens. To best
understand the multifaceted relationship between netizens, the regime, and the Internet,
this dual nature of the Internet in China will be discussed in the following section,
beginning with an exploration of its opportunities for netizens, including increased
political engagement, boosted Internet commerce, and stimulated education. The section
will conclude with the Internet’s challenges for netizens, focusing specifically on
cybersecurity, censorship, and information quality.
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Opportunities
The Internet’s ability to span distances in order to link individuals, be they
acquaintances, families, or strangers, allows the web to function as a modern political
tool, connecting netizens to all levels of the government regardless of physical location.
The Internet can effectively create this opportunity for netizens due to its unique,
unprecedented characteristics of “activity, immediacy, extensiveness, openness, and
richness” through increasingly creative, immersive platforms and content (Landtsheer et
al., 2014, p. 345). The accessibility of cyberspace thus allows netizens to speak their
minds through a variety of grassroots methods. For example, largely within the past
decade, netizens have formed coalitions to create interactive online columns that offer
their opinions, questions, proposals, and advice on policies or current events, such as the
widely known “Netizen Hall” or “Questions for the Prime Minister” platforms, perhaps
to praise, or perhaps to dissent. It is not uncommon for government officials to seek out
content posted on these accounts in order to gauge public opinion and to communicate
with citizens, similar to the ways in which officials will monitor and interact with content
regarding governmental affairs that is posted on social media microblogs. This ability for
netizens to voice their viewpoints on political processes alludes to what Landtsheer et al.
refers to as “supervising government,” in which Internet users have a distinct capacity to
check governmental authority in hopes of preventing corruption (2014, p. 353).
Not only can netizens express their firsthand political views online, but they can
become increasingly politically informed by tapping into the wealth of information
already present in cyberspace. For example, Internet users have the ability to access
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databases and logs of laws, news, regulations, demographics, geographic trends, and
contact information of government authorities that were incomplete or infeasible to
gather prior to the expansion of Internet. Furthermore, netizens have the opportunity to
investigate the backgrounds, stances, and histories of their politicians and regulatory
bodies, as almost 55,000 government websites have been registered as of 2014
(Landtsheer et al., 2014). Because of the availability of pertinent content on the web,
some scholars and politicians believe that, while cyberspace certainly has some
drawbacks, the Internet is a mostly beneficial tool that links people to politics.
As summarized by Landtsheer et al., there are five main ways the Internet
provides political opportunities for netizens: First, civic participation is expanded because
the Internet gives individuals easy ways to share their voices through a number of
communication channels (2014). Second, it allows netizens to play an active role in
shaping the policy-making process, rather than passively observing it. Third, the frequent
flow of information on the Internet enhances political transparency, as news pertaining to
laws or leaders can quickly be presented publicly. Forth, netizens can become more
educated by accessing documents and databases on topics that interest them. Fifth, the
Internet boosts socialization as it becomes an even wider used vehicle of political
conversation. As a culmination of these trends, the Internet allows netizens to become
more politically aware and active, presenting individuals with opportunities to engage
with and learn about policies and the people who make them at different levels. A 2005
survey on the Internet and political participation upholds Landtsheer’s arguments, which
reveals that approximately 63% of the respondents say citizens better understand politics,
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54% assert people have increased opportunities to discuss politics, and 45% believe
people have stronger political power as a result of the Internet (Chi, 2012). These
arguments and findings thus support the notion that the Internet serves as a link between
the government and the people.
Not only does the Internet allow netizens to increase their political engagement,
but it also has also paved the way for the current e-commerce platforms that are now
integral parts of netizens’ daily operations. As the mobile industry soars in China, nearly
one in two Chinese citizens has taken to online buying and selling items and services
online, predominantly through the usage of smartphones and tablets, as opposed to
desktop computers (Shadbolt, 2014). With over 500 million mobile shoppers in 2018,
China’s netizens totalled $1 trillion in online purchasing and accounted for almost 40%
of global retail e-commerce, which demonstrates the significant economic influence the
Internet provides Chinese netizens (Marinova, 2017). As Western e-commerce sites such
as Amazon and eBay are largely unsuccessful in China, the country’s large population
pours into thriving domestic platforms that link businesses and customers and that have
provided over 3.3 million jobs as of 2017 (China: E-commerce). China’s e-commerce
also successfully brings unique opportunities to netizens by essentially capitalizing upon
the idea of a “one-stop shop” in forward-thinking ways that specifically tailor to the
needs of consumers. To describe some of these opportunities, an analysis of two of
China’s top e-commerce providers, Alibaba and JD.com (Jingdong), is provided.
Alibaba and JD.com entered the e-commerce industry roughly twenty years ago,
in 1999 and 1998 respectively, which was early enough to experience many of the same
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competitive advantages that contribute to their continued success. Together, Alibaba and
JD.com comprise more than 85% of China’s e-commerce market (Long, 2018). Both
platforms offer netizens the ability to purchase a wide variety of items--ranging from
apparel, electronics, luggage, toys, home furnishings, seafood, alcohol, flowers, and even
certain minerals and chemicals--that can be ordered from a smartphone, processed
through a complex logistics system, and immediately shipped to a netizen’s door,
according to the Alibaba homepage. Though the platforms offer the same general buying
and purchasing functions, they offer a number of different advantages to netizens.
Boasting more than 600 million active monthly users, Alibaba emphasizes
“e-tailing” by running the majority of its selling operations directly through the web, as
opposed to physically retailing in stores (Mourdoukoutas, 2014). With such a large
Internet user base, devoting funds and resources to e-tailing allows Alibaba to meet more
netizens where they are so individuals can easily use the platform at their own
convenience. Additionally, Alibaba has created separate internal sites with the intention
of better marketing certain products to specific netizens, thus creating a specialized
shopping experience based on an online consumer’s needs. For example, Taobao hosts
cheaper products from smaller merchants, whereas Tmall offers brand name products that
usually come with a bigger price tag, which allows netizens to see the advantage of
accessing diverse products that are organized on inclusive sites.
This platform also provides netizens the opportunity of networking, a traditional
value of importance in China. Alibaba makes it easy for merchants to join their platform
by relying on revenue sharing as opposed to listing fees, which brings increasing amounts
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of merchants desiring to sell their products on the Alibaba website (Mourdoukoutas,
2014). When the online network expands, “the greater the benefits for each merchant, as
it attracts a large volume of customer traffic” through exposure and conversation
(Mourdoukoutas, 2014, para. 10). Netizens then feel a sense of community by interacting
with users of the same products and services across the Alibaba network. Internet users
furthermore trust that they can freely interact with fellow customers and merchants on
this e-commerce platform due to its positive relationship with the Chinese government,
which is “the gatekeeper of the economy, deciding who will be in what business and for
how long” (Mourdoukoutas, 2014, para. 11). As gatekeeper, the government allows many
domestic e-commerce platforms to thrive and create profitable competition, including
JD.com.
JD.com is notorious for utilizing modern technology to best connect with its
online customers, who amount to over 300 million per month (Laubscher, 2018). This
e-commerce platform has its more than 550 warehouses, same- or next-day shipping
logistics, and thousands of brick-and-mortar convenience stores to thank for its $67.2
billion net revenue for 2018, in addition to its thriving online shopping site, according to
its corporate blog. Avant-garde technological advancements, like artificial intelligence,
big data, and robotics, are incorporated to propel JD.com ahead of other companies and
to simplify the shopping process for netizens. For example, drones have been used since
2016 to deliver packages, which effectively speeds shipping and generates conversation
and interest among online shoppers (Marr, 2018). The company also uses technology to
modernize the customer experience, in which data is used to profile customers by
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tracking their tastes, interests, and trends to create a personalized e-commerce experience.
While not affecting online shopping just yet, JD.com has also been working on payment
through facial recognition model, in which convenience store shoppers would not even
have to stop and pay through traditional methods in years to come (Marr, 2018). All of
JD.com’s evolving technological implementations demonstrate that the company desires
to provide the easiest and safest shopping experience possible for netizens, in which
virtually any product can be purchased, shipping is revolutionized, counterfeits are
terminated, and customer information is protected. As a result of online shopping
platforms like Alibaba and JD.com, netizens have the opportunity to participate in the
country’s flourishing e-commerce quite literally at the push of a button.
Not only is the web an informative political instrument and an interactive
economic stimulant that simplifies the daily lives of Chinese Internet users, but it also
increases access to education and further connects the intellect of netizens across the
country. In particular, students at all levels of education are able to experience the various
opportunities provided by the Internet, especially after the 2015 introduction of the
Internet Plus framework by premier Li Keqiang. According to one of Li’s Reports on the
Work of the Government announcements, this policy serves “to integrate mobile Internet,
cloud computing big data, and the Internet of Things with modern manufacturing, to
encourage the healthy development of e-commerce, industrial networks, and Internet
banking, and to get Internet-based companies to increase their presence in the
international market,” which has largely been adapted to education within the past four
years (Sharwood, 2015, para. 5). Home to the largest education system in the world with

27

260 million students and 15 million teachers, the Internet has had significant impacts
among an influential population.
The Internet has grown exponentially popular in classrooms and curriculum
around the country since this legislation. For example, Internet access rates in primary
and secondary schools have skyrocketed within the past five years alone, which now
registers at an estimated 90% of schools, up from 25% in 2012 (Ying & Wanwei, 2017).
Increased Internet access currently allows netizens to conduct more in-depth research,
quickly share and publish their scholarship with others, apply for diverse schools, jobs,
and scholarships, and take extra classes without a commute (Ying & Wanwei, 2017). Not
only do netizens have greater capability than ever to learn from information on the web,
but they are also exposed to a more immersive learning experience in the classroom
because of the Internet’s adaptations to the needs and interests of students. Around 83%
of classrooms now implement multimedia learning techniques, such as video and social
media, that engage and resonate with learners, as opposed to the less than 40% in 2012
(Ying & Wanwei, 2017). Responding to demand by students and parents, some schools
have been established that combine these characteristics and are completely online, thus
offering netizens around the country the ability to acquire an education with more
personal authority.
The Internet Plus policy intends for the web to reach wide audiences due to the
common social nature of treating education as a “public service” (Ying & Wanwei,
2017). Similarly, Du Zhanyuan, China’s Deputy Minister of Education, has said that the
country will not only use the Internet to advance the quality of education, but it will
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ensure equitable access to education across varying populations (Ying & Wanwei, 2017).
For example, China has expanded the Internet to reach netizens who live in rural or
impoverished areas where there are shortages of teachers and resources, providing them
with unprecedented access to education through real-time tutoring sessions or online
courses (Ying & Wanwei, 2017). The web has also been used to create profiles with
personalized reports based on students’ abilities to process, diagnose, and analyze data,
thus boosting online learners’ understanding of their own educational progress (Ying &
Wanwei, 2017). As a result of these advancements, the Internet is used to create an even
playing field with equal opportunities among learners within China’s borders.
From this analysis, it can be concluded that the Internet certainly provides a great
number of opportunities for the millions of netizens in China. Some of these benefits
include various channels for political engagement and expression, numerous ways to
participate in the nation’s thriving e-commerce, and efficient educational methodologies
that are increasingly inclusive of China’s diverse citizenry. Though the opportunities for
Chinese netizens are substantial, accessing a technically borderless Internet within the
parameters set by an authoritarian regime also presents challenges for web users. A
sample of these challenges consists of cybersecurity concerns, potential regulation of
online content, and the debatable value and quality of information, which will be
discussed in the remainder of this section.
Challenges
While the rapid expansion of the Internet has undoubtedly advanced Chinese
society, sometimes growing pains persist, as “the malevolent side of cyberspace has
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increased in hand hand with the growing scale use of the benevolent side” (Lieberthal &
Singer, 2012, p. 2). The physical spread of the web and the increasing speed of its
operations matched with China’s large population can create challenges for cybersecurity
regulators, who are trying to keep in step with constant changes (Fei, 2011). Despite the
protective efforts put forth by these regulators, several vulnerabilities and problems exist
in China’s cyberspace that present concerns of data safety for netizens. For example,
Chinese websites are likely to attract botnets, which can be described as “a group of
computers infiltrated by a hacker and infected with malicious software, generally for the
purpose of attacking other information systems” (Fei, 2011, p. 186). While millions of
these botnets exist in countries across the globe, China was reported to have the largest
number of infected computers as recently as 2017 and has lingered in the top three places
for approximately the past ten years (Christ, 2017). As netizens share their data on
increasing amounts of “smart” devices with Internet connection--such as televisions,
watches, and tablets, to name a few--potentially sensitive, personal information is now
more susceptible to hacking than ever with botnets continuing to infect, shut down, or
exchange sites and servers. As a result, China may struggle to strike the balance between
reaping the economic and social benefits of Internet expansion and protecting the
personal data privacy of its netizens.
Not only is netizens’ personal data continuously at risk from bots, but malicious
attacks also compromise the information found on public accounts. Government websites
and accounts in particular are victims of routine hacking, detected at an average rate of
around 2,000 infiltrations per month (Fei, 2011). While it is not uncommon for countries
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or even governments to experience cybersecurity vulnerabilities, continued hacking of
the Chinese regime’s accounts may compromise the information consumed and trusted
by netizens desiring to be informed. Though it is difficult to find reliable information
regarding the origins of these cyber attacks, it is known that foreign hackers play a large
role in infiltrating China’s sites and servers (Fei, 2011). Scholars predict that international
cyberspace disunities are unlikely to be resolved soon, as the newness of the issue
coupled with the weight of suspicion and threat of espionage it carries “is so
overwhelming that it is unrealistic to seek cooperative arguments” at the time (Lieberthal
& Singer, 2012, p. 32). The lack of mutual trust among nations thus prevents making
significant progress in international cybersecurity cooperation, leaving assurance and
safety of netizens’ data in suspension.
In addition to information and cybersecurity uncertainties, the Internet also brings
challenges to netizens through the censorship of online content. Though the Internet
certainly provides numerous outlets for the free expression that is guaranteed to citizens
in China’s constitution, numerous restrictions apply to the ways in which netizens can
access and utilize the web. Generally, the Communist Party of China regulates Internet
content or platforms that are capable of reaching a wide audience, which includes certain
newspapers, films, music, pornography, games, television, radio, books, search engines,
and online businesses that diverge from the regime’s political and social status quo.
From an international perspective, the censorship of information detriments
Chinese netizens because they are deprived of a wealth of information regarding the
surrounding world and the country in which they live. For example, the blockade of
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certain international news outlets limits Chinese netizens’ knowledge of events, ideas, or
opinions that may be seen as inappropriate or sensitive by the regime, such as
information on the religious Falun Gong movement or the pro-democracy protests at
Tiananmen Square. Such a pattern repeats itself in books pertaining to China’s history
that may be banned due to the ways in which certain events, such as the deaths resulting
from the Great Chinese Famine between 1959 and 1961, were described and represented.
The same logic follows in the government’s reasoning for censorship of Western search
engines, social media platforms, and international online shopping platforms, thus
preventing Chinese netizens from being exposed to global conversations, social norms,
and viewpoints that may oppose those of the regime. As a result of its restrictive nature,
Western scholarship often condemns Internet censorship as a preeminent challenge upon
netizens.
While some Chinese netizens might agree with the common Western viewpoint
that censorship of Internet content is rather amoral and disadvantageous, it is common for
Chinese citizens and scholars to support censorship and perceive different challenges that
are largely technical. For example, simply the general inability to access a website, show,
or game is more frustrating for some Internet users than the fact that specific content is
being withheld from them. Those Internet users who support censorship are also likely to
willingly accept these types of difficulties imposed by censorship because they believe
regulation is mostly advantageous for society and worth some drawbacks. Additionally,
still other users may be unaware of censorship or its consequences, possibly thinking a
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banned site or platform is experiencing internal difficulties and seeing it as more of an
inconvenience than an intentional institutional block.
Not only does the Internet present challenges to users that stem from
cybersecurity and censorship, but the quality and value of information is also a
controversial challenge for netizens. While censorship certainly exists within Chinese
cyberspace, in which information is blocked and filtered by pro-regime actors, another
challenge for netizens lies in determining whether or not receiving partial information is
really equivalent to being truthfully informed. While the regime upholds that censorship
allows China to promote what is acceptable and hide what is corruptible, an Internet user
might find that the truth will be illuminated through government’s traditional, righteous
protection of content. On the other hand, a netizen may believe that access to only
acceptable information and restriction from harmful or sensitive information is hardly
truthful at all, and still others fall somewhere on the middle of this spectrum. The varying
viewpoints on the truth demonstrate the challenge netizens face between determining
traditional values within the government’s responsibility and their own personal
autonomy online.
Though there are numerous tangible benefits that stem from the cyberspace in
China, several challenges are also present for today’s netizens as the Internet continues to
expand. The balance between utilizing freedom of speech on the Internet while not
straying from the boundaries set by the regime is difficult to achieve, as many
comprehensive policies from numerous governing bodies detail abilities and limitations
of netizens and content providers but can still be rather ambiguous in practice. As a
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result, Chinese netizens may be left asking, how much free speech on the Internet is too
much free speech, and where does the line need to be drawn? In attempt to best
understand and develop this query, the following section will analyze the regime’s
responses to opportunities and challenges created by the Internet.
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PART FOUR: THE REGIME’S RESPONSE TO THE INTERNET
Just as the Internet brings opportunities and opposition to Chinese netizens, so the
double-edged nature of cyberspace also affects the authoritarian regime itself in both
advantageous and challenging ways that often overlap those impacting netizens.
Examples of the Internet’s opportunities for the regime include the ability to harness the
web as a political communication tool, as an e-commerce stimulant, and as a mechanism
of supremacy over netizens. On the other hand, the Internet brings various challenges for
the regime that center around the formidable task of implementing the most extensive
censorship apparatus in the world. As a result of the push and pull essence of the Internet,
it is necessary for the regime to find the balance between the freedom of information
access and the country’s historic content control. The responses from the regime to these
opportunities and challenges will be provided in this section.
Opportunities
A prominent benefit of Internet expansion is that the regime increasingly uses the
web as a political communication tool to engage netizens. Through social media, like
WeChat or Weibo in particular, the government can interact with netizens in
unprecedented ways by creating accounts for individual politicians, bureaucracies, or
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councils to post information on behalf of their respective organizations. In addition to
increasing the regime’s access and transparency, the creation of government social media
accounts allows the state to become better informed of citizens’ political demands,
expectations, questions, or doubts. For example, the regime is able to gauge public
opinion by following the “likes” and “shares” of post analytics in order to detect, in real
time, what policies or issues netizens currently support or oppose. Similarly, the
government can understand the broader viewpoints of netizens by reading--and even
responding to--netizens’ conversations and debates on current events with other Internet
users. Interacting with netizens on social media also allows the regime to stay abreast of
conversations with collective action potential, such as political protests and
demonstrations, that may attempt to gain grassroots support across cyberspace. Social
media thus allows the state to stay in sync with its constituents and efficiently craft
policies and resolutions in response to their interests. In response to these trends, 55% of
Chinese believe the government better serves the public and 60% say the regime better
appreciates the public’s viewpoints by implementing the Internet into political
communication (Chi, 2012, p. 395).
Aside from social media, state-run media also presents opportunities for the
regime to connect with netizens on political issues. These platforms allow the state to
control the language and tone with which news is disseminated, thus resulting in potential
modifications to political news coverage in favor of the regime’s agenda. While
numerous independent news outlets exist today, examples of these respected, vital state
platforms include the Xinhua news agency and the People’s Daily n ewspaper, which are
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two of China’s largest, most accessed media organizations, regardless of ownership. By
supplying daily coverage on politics in multiple languages, the state is able to use these
websites to reach millions of diverse netizens all over the world on the happenings in
Beijing, while often excluding anti-regime sentiment and events from stories. As a result
of these influential state-owned multimedia platforms, netizens are exposed to content
that the People’s Republic of China deems credible and consequential with the click of a
button. The regime thus uses social media and traditional media to maintain political
stability by promoting acceptable messages to society (Chi, 2012, p. 396).
In addition to utilizing the Internet as a political communication mechanism, the
regime also responds to the influx of cyberspace by capitalizing upon the opportunities of
China’s successful internal e-commerce. As previously discussed, China supports the
healthy competition between domestic e-commerce platforms, such as Alibaba and
JD.com, that provide efficient, personalized shopping experiences for netizens. Perhaps
more importantly to the regime, however, this competition has largely weeded out foreign
contenders, which leaves China completely dominating its own market for online
retailers. The state furthermore reaps the financial benefits that result from this domestic
supremacy, with retail e-commerce revenue totalling $636 billion as of 2018 and is
projected to cross $1 trillion by 2022 (E-commerce revenue). Though international
competitors like Amazon and eBay are available in China, they have been unable to
resonate with Chinese consumers, causing Amazon’s market share in China to plummet
to 1.3% in 2016 and eBay to be considered by many news outlets as a failure (Lin &
Stevens, 2017). Thus, netizens’ neglect of international powerhouses and loyalty to
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domestic shopping sites has played a significant role in the acceleration of China’s
economy. As these sites soar in revenue and mobile payment grows increasingly popular
in China, it is no surprise that the regime has the Internet to thank for becoming one of
the world’s commerce leaders in less than a decade (Marinova, 2017).
Not only does the regime experience the Internet’s opportunities in terms of
political engagement and e-commerce growth, but it also takes advantage of cyberspace
by utilizing the web as an agent of supremacy over netizens and even content providers.
As previously mentioned, China has developed extensive methodologies of Internet
regulation that permit the state to withhold or mandate certain information from Chinese
citizens, which serves as an intentional reminder of government authority. Though these
methodologies will be detailed in the following section, some methods include the often
required registration of Internet platforms and user data with the government. Since
straying from the boundaries set by the regime will likely be met with formal or informal
consequences, content providers often participate in asserting self-discipline within the
Internet industry, in which they can submit a legal document to pledge allegiance to
willingly follow rules in order to find favor with the state. Content providers thus
participate in these methods of self-discipline to evade consequences from the regime,
which places the power of the Internet in the hands of the Chinese government.
Not only has the regime made complying with regulations appealing to Internet
service providers to emphasize its own authority, but it also has extended this mindset to
netizens in order to monitor their data. WeChat, for example, dominates China’s social
media landscape because it offers essentially every possible function on one application,
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as it is “the equivalent of WhatsApp plus Facebook plus PayPal plus Uber plus GrubHub
plus many other things,” rendering other platforms insufficient (Yuan, 2019, para. 1). In
order to acquire the most optimal experience from these full-service Internet platforms,
netizens enter seemingly limitless personal data such as addresses, locations, credit card
numbers, dining preferences, voice recordings, political preferences, search histories, and
passwords, into the electronic system. However, like WeChat, some Internet platforms
“provide the government with an unprecedented glimpse into the lives of Chinese
citizens--what they discuss, how they spend money, and where they gather”
(McLauchlin, 2017, para. 4). As a result of this relationship, almost a billion netizens
willingly offer a consolidation of their personal information to surveillance from the
state, which again points to the regime’s supremacy over the Internet.
Though the Internet provides the regime these opportunities and many others,
such as accelerated scholarship and cohesion among different levels of government, the
regime faces the arduous task of enforcing censorship within cyberspace that serves the
highest number of Internet users in the world. The regime therefore faces the challenge of
finding the balance between what to censor, what to allow, and what conversations will
define Chinese society in its past, present, and future. As the regime has characteristically
regulated expression in order to guide the public understanding of news and history, the
regime may not see censorship itself as a challenge; rather, the intensive, laborious, and
costly enforcement of censorship is undoubtedly challenging when time and resources
could potentially be allocated elsewhere. The following section thus describes censorship
in the Chinese context, with the challenge for the regime deriving from the strenuous

39

implementation of Internet censorship and the need to strike a balance between
expression and authority.
Challenges
China began to utilize the Internet after many Western nations, but regime
leadership eventually came to believe that harnessing the potential of the Internet would
benefit China domestically and internationally, resulting in the country’s ability to
establish an influential economy and a solidified national identity (Tai, 2012). According
to Tai, the regime asserted that expanding Internet access would help the country catch
up to and potentially even surpass the economies of other countries by providing jobs,
generating productivity, and stimulating a continuous notion of self-improvement. As
“the Chinese government has supported the development of the Internet as a tool for
business, entertainment, education, and information exchange,” methods to control it
were almost simultaneously developed from the federal government (MacKinnon, 2008,
p. 31). Regardless of surveillance mechanisms, China’s adaptation and commercialization
of the Internet among entrepreneurs and corporations led to the nation’s current rank as
the fastest-growing economy in the world.
Because the Internet is technically borderless, Tai also writes that the regime
wanted to control access to certain information to create an Internet presence that adheres
to China’s unique cultural and social views (2012). Since the century of humiliation that
officially ended in 1949, which comprised China’s struggle to determine its identity and
reach international reputability, party leadership avoids legitimizing means that might
compromise its power as a nation or its cohesive identity. Therefore, the regime also
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encourages usage of the Internet to create and promote its own national identity as the
number of Internet users within the country climbs. As the Internet certainly brings
numerous benefits to the regime, like the previously mentioned bolstered economy and
upheld unified identity, the expansion of cyberspace has provided challenges for the
Chinese regime as Internet access expands.
As previously mentioned, governmental censorship in the People’s Republic of
China includes all content with the capability of circulation, whether that be television,
broadcast or print journalism, theater, radio, literature, instant messaging, or the Internet.
The Communist Party of China holds that censorship of Internet content in particular is a
legal duty that does not conflict with recognized rights of the citizenry, such as freedom
of press or speech (Wang, 2016). The censorship of netizens’ free expression on social
media platforms has unequivocally affected Chinese society in various ways.
In contrast to media in the United States, in which a handful of prominent content
providers resemble an oligarchy in the country’s social media landscape, hundreds of
local websites comprise China’s Internet presence (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). Just as
China’s Internet content is fragmented, so the regime’s patrolling of these sites is
fragmented across local, provincial, and national levels of authority in response to federal
legislation. The Cyberspace Administration of China, the Central Propaganda Office, and
the State Council Information Office are three examples of the numerous federal
institutions that create censorship policies concerning Chinese netizens and Internet
service providers.
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When Internet access began to expand to Chinese citizens in the late 1990s,
federal policies were quickly promulgated to harness the potential of the Internet. The
detailed legislation that provides a large part of the backbone for Chinese Internet
censorship is entitled the Computer Information Network and Internet Security,
Protection and Management Regulations, stemming from the Ministry of Public Security.
Since its inception in 1997, the guidelines affect every online network inside the
country’s boundaries, specifying what netizens may not utilize the Internet to do, whether
acting in groups or as private individuals (Computer, 1997). Directly according to Article
5 of this act, netizens may not intend to damage online networks or generate the
following content:
(1) Inciting to resist or breaking the Constitution or laws or the implementation of
administrative regulations;
(2) Inciting to overthrow the government or the socialist system;
(3) Inciting division of the country, harming national unification;
(4) Inciting hatred or discrimination among nationalities or harming the unity of
the nationalities;
(5) Making falsehoods or distorting the truth, spreading rumors, destroying the
order of society;
(6) Promoting feudal superstitions, sexually suggestive material, gambling,
violence, murder;
(7) Terrorism or inciting others to criminal activity; openly insulting other people
or distorting the truth to slander people;
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(8) Injuring the reputation of state organs;
(9) Other activities against the Constitution, laws or administrative regulations.”
The act additionally requires Internet service providers to adhere to surveillance
and guidance from the governing council and to keep a log of violations on each
platform. Furthermore, netizens must register accounts with legitimate identities so
content providers can keep an updated record of netizen information to report to the
Ministry of Public security if necessary. The Administrative Measures on Information
Services, issued by Order Number 292 in 2000, creates more specific guidelines for
Internet service providers to follow, such as licensing systems, business plans, and
safeguarding measures for netizen safety (Administrative, 2000). Both policies remain
influential in providing legal basis for institutional censorship that is subject to the
discretion of the regime.
For example, the first piece of legislation includes a rather broad clause that
creates a provision for federal Internet censorship, which states that the “Public Security
computer management and supervision organization should establish a system for
ensuring the security, protection, and good management of the connecting network units,
entry point units and users” (Computer, 1997, Article 17). This loose phrase allows the
regime to exercise surveillance across the local, provincial, and federal levels through
various mechanisms that will later be discussed, such as hand-censorship, keyword
blocking and the Great Firewall.
Though federal institutions mandate these policies, King, et al. asserts that
intermediary actors such as Internet service providers and educational institutions act as
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the enforcing bodies of the regime’s censorship guidelines (2013). According to Han, the
state chooses to utilize these agents to divert blame and backlash from regulation away
from the party itself (2018). When deciding whether to comply with or resist the regime’s
regulations, these bodies must consider and balance the interests of their stakeholders,
one of which is the party, with administrative authority over what content stays and what
goes; the netizens, who keep a social media platform running; and the organization,
which is trying to survive. Han thus suggests that intermediary actors often exercise
“discontented compliance,” in which they know it is too costly to resist the regime, but
these bodies may involuntarily implement various censorship mechanisms on their
platforms (2018, p. 60).
As the Internet evolves into a more necessary and inclusive apparatus that
connects individuals, organizations, and global citizens, so the regime has created diverse
mechanisms of patrolling China’s expanding cyberspace. Whereas some governments
implement a rather laissez-faire approach to the influx of social media, the Chinese
regime has effectively combined policy and technological measures in effort to control
potential disorder or loss of central authority within society. Common methods of modern
censorship include preventative measures, manual censorship, keyword blocking, user
surveillance, immersive measures, and self-censorship.
Perhaps the most recognizable example of state control of Chinese Internet is
known as the Great Firewall of China, which was officially entitled the Golden Shield
Project (McDonald, 2016). With work on the project beginning in 1999, Fang Binxing
championed what would become the Great Firewall with the assistance of multiple
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agencies; as a result, censorship quickly increased as the number of Internet users
skyrocketed after 2002 (The art, 2013). This preventative measure creates a holistic
blockade between netizens and entire websites or networks by requiring all content
coming through Chinese cyberspace to face strict subject analysis (Tai, 2012). Sites
blocked from Chinese Internet include Facebook, Google, Youtube, WordPress,
Snapchat, Instagram, Bloomberg, and The New York Times, among others. This
preventive form of censorship is largely automatic in that its routers discover sets of
blacklisted keywords, causing the Great Firewall to sever connection between the netizen
and the site he or she was attempting to access (MacKinnon, 2018, p. 41). After the
connection is terminated, users are taken to a screen informing them of that webpage’s
unavailability and are frozen on that page for ninety seconds. Content may be blocked if
the regime deems it undesirable or unwanted, thus demonstrating China’s intention to
proactively shape and create a “management of popular opinion” (Han, 2018, p. 5).
Chinese netizens have thus created and utilized local social media platforms, like RenRen
and Sina Weibo among a wealth of others, that offer Chinese netizens relatively the same
functions and the ability to express themselves (King et al., 2013).
According to Tai, netizens may utilize technological advances—such as computer
applications and virtual private networks like Tor, Freenet, and Triangleboy—in attempt
to evade the Great Firewall’s content blockades (2012). The same source states that
within the past decade, the regime has greatly restricted access to these underground
Internet portals, though any statistical evidence of netizens using such circumvention
methods is inaccurate and unreliable.
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Though censorship is imposed in a relatively blanket level across the country
through the Great Firewall, the regime can exert tightened, specific restriction through
manual censorship (Tai, 2012). King, et al. states that manual censorship, or the
implementation of humans employed to actively read and filter posts by hand, is the most
demanding form of social media regulation, as the media landscape in China is
fragmented across hundreds of sites (2013). The same source asserts that these regulating
bodies include tens of thousands of Internet police and Internet monitors, as well as
around 250,000 patrolling party members. In this censorship mechanism, objectionable
posts—which often include but are not limited to comments regarding government
criticism, pornography, fraudulent activity, or complaints about social media censorship
itself— can be manually deleted or accounts can be locked (McDonald, 2016). McDonald
also writes that individuals may experience this type of censorship if a regulatory agent
deems the content inappropriate or if it is reported as inappropriate by another user.
In contrast to the comprehensive Great Firewall, rates of manual censorship vary
across territory lines in China. For example, highly-populated provinces that boast many
speakers, scholars, and singers, such as Xizang and Qinghai, are more likely to face
greater Internet monitor censorship to “curtail private resistance” (Tai, 2012, p. 113).
Consequently, McDonald states that the Great Firewall is met with more resistance in
urban areas (2016). The same source states that, in contrast, rural provinces like Sichuan
and Shaanxi have lower post deletion rates due to lack of citizen access to technology and
sparse populations, thus reducing the general population’s ability to freely transmit oneor two-way messages. Regardless of geographic location, manual censors delete or filter
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posts quickly. A 2011 study by King et. al based on 1,382 Chinese websites reveals that
posts considered undesirable by the regime were largely deleted within twenty-four hours
of the original publication time, though some material lingered for a few days until
deleted (2013).
According to the same source, another type of social media regulation is keyword
blocking, which prevents netizens from posting certain words or phrases that are
considered taboo. Similar to content that may be subject to post deletions, the same
author finds that examples of taboo topics include commentary on censors and
government policies, as well as certain arrests, religious groups, scandals, and protests.
However, King et al. states that users can utilize circumvention methods to evade this
type of censorship by using satire, analogies, and metaphors to hint at the intended term
or phrase (2013). The same source states that netizens may also substitute characters to
convey an intended message by using homophones, which are characters that sound alike,
or homographs, characters that look alike.
Not only does the regime employ social media censorship through preventative
measures like the Great Firewall, manual censorship through post deletions, and keyword
blocking, but intermediary actors--the content service providers linking the regime and
the netizens--are also charged to keep tabs on users by mandating basic user information.
Since censorship is such a large task, “the regime relies more heavily on domestic
companies to police their own content” and are then held accountable for what takes
place on their own platforms (MacKinnon, 2008, p. 42). When intermediary agents
comply with the censorship guidelines set by the regime, there are a few regulatory tools
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that are consistent across most bodies. For example, Han states that many content
providers provide contact information to authorities, keep user data available for broad
uses at the regime’s discretion, surveil online content to prevent objectionable expression,
utilize pre-screening technology to filter netizens’ posts, and join forces with reputable
local universities to lower chances of violations on their sites (2018).
Many intermediary agents will create site-specific regulations that enforce state
policies, such as employing “their own 24-hour cybermanagers to enforce the official
rules to varying degrees” (Tai, 2012, p. 101). King et al. finds that Internet service
providers often employ up to 1,000 proactive online censors per website to best ensure
that the outlet is operating within the regime’s guidelines (2012). Tai furthermore states
this movement quickly caught on across the Internet industry, ultimately creating
associations of Internet service providers that band together to pledge their self-discipline
in accordance with the regime, which began with corporations as early as 1997 (2012).
However, some intermediary actors face censorship with resistance. In order to
enforce federally mandated censorship while attempting to meet the needs of netizens,
Han finds that some bodies delay censorship or promote debatable discussions on their
platforms to resist government Internet regulation (2018). Touching again on Han’s
theory of discontent compliance, intermediary agents must find a balance between the
demands from the state and from netizens in order for individual platforms to survive
(2018).
Because social media can pave the way for groupthink and mobilization, the
government also joins the Internet in various immersive measures in attempt to control
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the flow of online information. Though the following three methods are not inherently
censorship measures, the state uses 1) governmental social media accounts, 2) the
“fifty-cent army,” and 3) opinion leaders to evade the social media landscape and add
pro-regime content to cyberspace.
Han finds that the 1999 Government Online Project has led to the registration of
almost 55,000 government websites that push state-sponsored content out to netizens
(2018). Additionally, this source states that government bodies quickly adapted to the rise
of social media and have created over 164,000 verified government social pages on
Weibo alone. Furthermore, common scholarship asserts that state agencies may publish
social media that diverts netizens away from questioning internal issues in China or from
expression undesirable emotion online. The regime thus immerses itself into the social
media landscape in attempt to shape public opinion in favor of the state’s policies and
administration.
Perhaps the most widely known state immersion of the Internet outside of
censorship is called the “fifty-cent army” of Internet communicators. The fifty-cent army
is largely based off of the Chinese public relations tactic called “astroturfing,” in which
actors who are “(often paid) to display apparent grassroots support for a product, policy,
or event to shore up wider and more genuine support” (Han, 2018, p. 107). Using this
mindset, individual members of the fifty-cent army can create multiple accounts to
generate conversation on a topic of choice and shape it in a particular direction. Such
individuals are employed to talk like regular Internet users, link government statistics and
websites, support members of leadership, and even fabricate political information.
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Though there is limited information on these bodies for obvious reasons, it is rumored
that the name comes from their initial pay of fifty cents per post (Han, 2018).
This author claims, however, that the fifty-cent army is more useful in pleasing
central state leadership than engaging and conniving netizens to adhere to their
viewpoints for various reasons. For example, these Internet communicators often lack
incentive because they are poorly rewarded for posts, so their work is often ineffectively
done. Additionally, in recent years it has become easier to detect the fifty-cent army’s
posts by using metadata. These posts often come in bursts from the same geographic
location and are repetitive in content. Due to lack of incentive, these paid Internet
communicators hardly engage in critical discussions and generally post short, blatant
assertions praising the regime.
The third immersive measure the regime uses to shape the social media landscape
is targeting opinion leaders of microblogs, whom netizens perceive to be credible. The
regime’s attempts to harness the potential of microbloggers because public debates,
critical opinions, and social analysis have “weakened the influence of the party media in
setting the news agenda” (Li, 2015, p. 18). According to Li, ways in which the
government influences these leaders include analyzing their numbers of followers, their
attitude to protecting state interests, their ability to promote Chinese ideology and culture,
their initiative in following state policies, and their implementation of reputable personal
rights. Public opinion leaders meeting these qualifications are encouraged to promote
party endeavors and to post information favorable of the regime on microblogs in an
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effort to fulfill President Xi Jinping’s “long-term mission” of “guiding public opinion”
(Li, 2015, p. 19).
Though the Great Firewall, post deletions, and account lockouts certainly deter
netizens from spreading messages, self-censorship is often personally implemented
among Chinese netizens. Ying states that self-censorship occurs when individuals or
organizations choose to consciously follow Internet regulation guidelines that are
promulgated by the regime (2012). Tai asserts that the magnitude of censorship
mechanisms primarily exists to enforce this notion of self-regulation among netizens, not
to block ideas or criticisms (2012). Whether Internet users are hoping not to cause
disruption with the state or if they are simply weary of upsetting friends and family with
their opinions, many netizens—especially in rural areas—believe it is better to leave
sensitive or objectionable content off of social media (McDonald, 2016).
If netizens or organizations do not adhere to censorship guidelines, “different
kinds of expression have different values or prices,” meaning that terms for validating
censorship are largely subjective to the platform and to the regime’s discretion (Ying,
2012, p. 77). For example, the 2013 Seven Bottom Line Policy holds that microbloggers,
who have the most freedom to post inaccurate information based on the layout of the
platform, could face “up to three to five years in prison if the posting is viewed more than
5,000 times or retweeted 500 times” (Li, 2015, p. 17). According to Freedom House
(2018), general penalties for violating the regime’s guidelines on the Internet or in
physical assembly may include formal punishment, such as fines or incarceration, or
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consequences that are less formal and even harder to track, like harassment or
intimidation.
Because processes regarding the Great Firewall and censorship in general are
largely withheld from the public, it is difficult for scholars to estimate the costs of
censorship in China. Regarding the Great Firewall alone, however, cost projections for its
creation and implementation begin around the equivalence of $60 million and shoot
upward by hundreds of millions of dollars (The art, 2013). On a broader scale, Internet
censorship falls under national concern for public security, which receives a
comprehensive budget for all levels of government to maintain stability within society.
According to the Nikkei Asian Review, i n 2018 the expenditure for the sector of public
security was 1.24 trillion yuan, or around $193 billion, up from 769 billion yuan in 2014.
This surpasses China’s expenditure for national defense by an estimated 19%, a record
high gap. Therefore, it can be concluded that the regime places significant value in
censoring Internet content and social media effectively, which creates notable effects.
Though it is true that the regime is able to adapt well in the midst of an expanding
cyberspace, there are a number of challenges the Internet and its censorship brings to the
government. For example, Han asserts that the inevitable differences in agendas and
goals across fragmented regulatory authorities can ultimately lead to counterproductivity
and inefficiencies in execution (2018). Similarly, just as the government disperses
regulation across central, provincial, and local apparatuses, so the use of the Internet has
become fragmented across individual websites and netizens. This pluralization of the
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Internet has resulted in the emergence of dissident groups of Chinese netizens, who can
speak out against the regime or promote their personal agendas online.
By providing opportunities for citizens to connect and mobilize themselves, the
Internet inevitably opens the door for expression that is unwelcomed by the regime.
Despite attempts to curtail free expression, dissent does still exist in various forms of
communication that could pose challenges for the regime. For example, Tai finds that
individual netizens can send mass emails to fellow dissidents and post on online bulletin
boards that offer more private conversation, rather than taking to the censored social
media giants like WeChat, QQ, or Weibo (2012). Additionally, large-scale movements to
advocate for the freedom of expression, democracy, and liberalization, such as the
Tiananmen Square and Falun Gong demonstrations in the late 1990s, have connected
thousands of dissidents across the country in effort to directly challenge the regime.
Though governmental regulations control undesirable content in cyberspace, the Internet
nevertheless facilitates conversations among netizens that could effectively challenge the
regime.
Often stemming from these dissident groups, the increased awareness of the
government’s more immersive censorship tactics decreases netizens’ trust of the regime’s
leadership, propaganda, and ideology, according to Han (2018). For example, creating
inauthentic posts through the fifty-cent army and encouraging opinion leaders to espouse
prescribed viewpoints actually skews citizen feedback, which limits governmental
response to citizens’ interests and slows potential adjustments to policy. As censorship
results in weakening political trust and social cohesion, Han argues that China’s
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censorship of netizen expression has actually delegitimized the regime, rather than
maintained its authoritarian power (2018).
Impacts of the party’s censorship do not stop within the borders of China. The
United States of America classified the regime’s extensive censorship as a barrier to trade
in 2013 since many of the most globally used platforms were blocked, causing businesses
to experience negative consequences due to restriction from engaging in many of China’s
online markets (Mozur, 2016). For example, government agencies are attempting to ban
sales of the Apple iPhone in China, and restricting cellular sales from the largest
smartphone market in the world would nonetheless take a toll on this monumental foreign
industry in particular. Even though China has banned access to many foreign platforms,
China’s own e-commerce is booming. Domestic companies such as Alibaba and Baidu,
China’s version of Google, have become some of the largest international organizations
on the Web, which repeats the theme of successful internal social media platforms in the
country.
The examination of the country’s censorship apparatuses demonstrates that
Chinese Internet users certainly have the ability to express their opinions and ideas on
acceptable social platforms through legal rights guaranteed by the constitution. However,
the Chinese government openly acknowledges that repercussions are likely to ensure if
netizens’ expression strays from the parameters of decent content laid out by the regime.
In reality, some of the repercussions of China’s Internet censorship can present
challenges to the regime itself, such as the possibility of generating dissident mobilization
or the general distrust and opposition toward the government’s motives. Such a complex,
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often strained relationship between netizens and the regime thus depends upon balancing
personal expression with governmental order. The following section analyzes what
comprises this balance and how it currently works for China.
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PART FIVE: FINDING EQUILIBRIUM ON THE INTERNET
This section describes viewpoints found in literature that attempt to answer why
censorship has historically been able to exist in the past and whether or not it should
continue in the future.
Historical Perspectives
Current scholarship poses diverse theories or reasonings behind the
implementation of governmental Internet regulations. One paramount rationale for
censorship holds that the Chinese regime expurgates certain material to maintain order
and status quo within Chinese society in all spheres (King et al., 2013). Supported widely
by current research, this broad theory asserts that the regime seeks to display itself in the
most favorable light possible, which extends to its values, its policies, and its history.
Potential examples of what content might be censored under this theory include
vulgarities and pornography, which are censored at a continuously high rate (King, et al.,
2013). Whether pornography exists in its inherent form, is disguised by news, or is
mentioned in online literature, the regime typically censors this content at a rate that is
almost proportional to the amount that is posted; for example, if ten articles of content
involving pornography are uploaded, nearly eight of them would be removed, and if
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fifteen similar articles were uploaded in February, nearly thirteen of them would be
removed, as was the case in 2011 (King, et al. 2013). Since pornography, obscenity, and
vulgarity do not reflect the societal order the Chinese regime desires to perpetuate, much
of this content is censored under this theory.
A second hypothesis serving as justification and rationale for China’s
authoritarian censorship is termed the state critique theory. Essentially on the flip side of
the same coin as the previous theory, the state critique assertion maintains that the party
attempts to quash dissent and to refute thoughts and ideas that are not in accordance with
the regime, its policies, and its leaders. Rather than removing content that simply does
not mesh with society’s values, as in the previous theory, this theory holds that content of
condemnatory nature is often filtered. This theory is thus a mechanism used to sustain the
stability of the regime by removing threatening content and ultimately making “the sum
total of available public expression more favorable to those in power” (King, et al., 2013,
p. 2). Examples of potentially censored content include negative assessments of party
leaders, policy implications, or, most importantly, criticisms of the human censors sorting
through Internet content. A study by the American Political Science Review d emonstrates
that criticism of censors, such as content mentioning throwing shoes at Fang Binxing,
Baidu copyright issues, and platforms being hacked, are subject to a relatively high
censorship magnitude (King, et al., 2013). Consequently, the deletion of and blockades
from certain content leaves the Internet with commentary that is largely in favor of the
regime. Similarly, Li suggests that the state desires to create a “monopoly on
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information” that grows in direct proportion to the Internet, which is achieved through
some of the most sophisticated censorship mechanisms in the world (Li, 2015, p. 15).
On the other hand, the collective action potential theory from the same authors
posits that censorship is likely to occur when netizens utilize social media to
communicate and generate mass action based on motivations other than those supported
by the government, which may lead to political opposition or societal disruption that
could challenge the authoritarian government (King et al., 2013). Social media in China
has proven to shape and reconfigure netizens’ daily experiences and interactions,
including collective action, which the authors describe as “an indicator of social and
political change” (Zhao & Liu, 2015, p. 41). King et al. continues to assert that these
theories sometimes work hand-in-hand, in that political opposition through collective
action is often spurred by posting critiques of the state (2013). This trend results in a
circular relationship in which the regime’s reasoning behind post deletions or content
blocking can be multifaceted. However, the authors of this study argue that the regime
primarily censors to prevent content with collective action material, which tends to face
higher censorship rates than state criticism. Because this hypothesis is more specific than
the previous theory and is substantially more supported by quantitative research than the
second, many scholars support this premises behind the collective action potential theory.
The collective action theory may include netizens using language that verbally
support or even pave the way toward group formation in events, advocacy, or protests, in
which the latter “is often thought to be the death knell of authoritarian regimes” (King et
al., 2013). Though relatively small protests are acceptable and even welcome in China,
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expression regarding large-scale protests that are not motivated by the state can become
highly censored. For example, speech on social media concerning protests in Inner
Mongolia, the Zengcheng protests, the pro-democracy protests in Tiananmen Square, and
the independence protests in Tibet and Taiwan hold some of the highest censorship in the
history of Internet in China (King et al., 2013).
In complete contrast to the previous three theories, other scholarship holds that
mainstream studies overlook the benefits censorship brings to Chinese society. According
to Ying (2012), censorship brings productivity, collectivity, and nobility by linking
individuals to networks through discourse and acceptable Internet content. The author
states that censorship was traditionally defined as “direct forms of political intervention
mostly by the state” that act in response to the growing knowledge of netizens (Ying,
2012, p. 68). As today’s social media platforms expand and develop, however, censorship
has become less direct and more fragmented, operating on a beneficial case-by-case
basis, in which some content on a particular topic may be allowed and other content may
not. According to Ying, the notion of state censorship can contemporarily be considered
an effect of rising power from Chinese citizens, rather than a holistic means of imposing
impermeable power over the people.
Just as scholarship provides various methodologies behind the existence of
censorship, so modern theories also present diverging viewpoints on the basis of its
continuance for future generations. Authors who cannot justify the future of content
regulation often base their arguments on the deprivation of human rights and the
developmental limitations upon society that censorship bestows. In contrast to the
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viewpoints in these articles, some literature supports the future of governmental
censorship based on its ability to protect young or other vulnerable populations from
exposure to sensitive content. The remainder of this section will be devoted to examining
examples of these arguments.
Future Perspectives
Chinese artist Ai Weiwei writes in The New York Times t hat “censorship in China
places limits on knowledge and values, which is the key to imposing ideological slavery”
upon Chinese citizens (Weiwei, 2017, para. 19). As victims of this slavery, he asserts that
Internet users receive information that is cherry-picked and force-fed by the state, thus
robbing individuals of their ability to intellectually and naturally think for themselves. To
this violation of human rights, the author posits that many Chinese netizens often “feign
ignorance and speak in ambiguities,” opting to passively self-censor their own content,
silence their personal opinions, and willingly become inferior to the regime (Weiwei,
2017, para. 2). According to the author, this mindset of surrender that is so encouraged by
the government eliminates Chinese netizens’ ability to choose independence and
happiness in life. Because censorship directly violates the basic rights of humans, this
author hopes for a future without expression of regulation (Weiwei, 2017, para. 20).
Not only do some think that censorship should not be prolonged because it
infringes upon netizens’ basic human rights, but other authors believe the idea behind
content regulation hinders social development. According to Tkacheva, Schwartz,
Libicki, Taylor, Martini, & Baxter, attempting to confine a limitless arena like cyberspace
does not work to provide an optimal society (2013). The basic functions of the Internet
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are designed to empower people through instantaneous communication and the exchange
of ideas, “which are antithetical to regimes that seek to manage and control political
discourse” and powerful social mobilization (Tkacheva et. al, 2013, p. 203). Thus, by
stimulating the expansion of the cyberspace but creating virtual parameters within which
users must operate, the authors would argue that the Chinese regime is “[struggling]
against the underlying nature of the Internet itself” and limiting its own societal
development (Tkacheva et. al, 2013, p. 203). Because of this multifaceted, juxtapositional
relationship, Tkacheva et. al writes that censorship has potentially detrimental effects on
the Chinese authoritarian regime itself, such as the willingness of netizens to “hide their
true attitudes out of fear of retribution” online, that could possibly be resolved through
release of technological restrictions and a gradual acceptance of increased Internet
freedom (2013, p. 209). Despite the international push for free expression in China,
however, the authors recognize that censorship of online information has become almost
characteristic of authoritarian regimes and is likely to define China’s cyberspace in days
to come.
In contrast to these anti-censorship viewpoints, other scholarship holds that
censorship is an integral part of China’s future because it protects some of the country’s
defenseless or naive citizens from interacting with inappropriate or fake content. For
example, some scholars believe that the availability of pornographic or violent content on
the web would lead to the destruction of the children who witness it, as well as a potential
rise in sex crimes due to predators luring in children through websites. Xin Li writes that
these younger, less mature populations “do not have strong judgement to [distinguish]
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good or bad, so they are easily influenced to follow improper activities from online
sources” and potentially repeat the offenses they observe through screens (2013, p. 4). In
addition to protecting children, the author also asserts that censorship is necessary in
order to protect China’s more vulnerable, less informed citizens from fake information
planted by terrorists. Though the regime does not guarantee the complete restriction of all
sensitive material on the Internet, the author believes that “society would be more
terrifying without censorship” (Li 2013, p. 5). As a result of these potential dangers from
a borderless cyberspace, the author believes China’s limitation of malicious content is
justified and recommends that other governments follow suit if the web is ever used to
impede society.
While literature on social media and Internet censorship in China is rather limited,
many diverse viewpoints on its causes and its justification for the future exist. Many
common theories of censorship methodology stem from the government’s desire to
maintain supremacy over Chinese netizens; for example, the previously mentioned
theories focus on the needs of upholding the national status quo, sifting out dissent from
the public, and filtering content with collective action potential. However, an opposing,
less common theory behind content regulation holds that censorship is a practice that has
always been accepted in China because its benefits outweigh its consequences. Current
scholarship also offers different stances regarding whether or not censorship should
continue in China’s future, with opponents saying it degrades human rights and stunts the
growth of society, and proponents asserting that it rightfully protects citizens from
inappropriate or false information. Combining this literature review with the proceeding
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information in this section, this comprehensive part serves as a presentation of the
equilibrium argument.
Primary Research on Internet Equilibrium Today
Today’s forms of online expression in China are contingent upon the cooperation
of the both the state and the people. For example, if the state wanted to quash all criticism
of party leaders and every protest of policies, the authoritarian regime could justify doing
so through its technological advancements and fragmented censorship mechanisms across
all levels of government. Likewise, if citizens of China desired to completely rebel
against the regulatory apparatuses on social media by flooding the web with sensitive
content or allusions to forbidden words and phrases, netizens have the means of
attempting to make these actions a reality. However, neither of these circumstances have
occurred because the regime and netizens have struck a balance that renders censorship
largely advantageous for society, in which netizens are willing to trade the drawbacks of
content removal to protect what is prosperous. The current balance thus lies in the
historical context of censorship and the relatively supportive viewpoints of netizens. In
order to further explain this equilibrium, this section will describe how the regime has
implemented censorship over time and how Chinese netizens currently respond.
Regime
In order to explore China’s social media and Internet landscape, it is essential to
first understand the broader culture and environment in which the country operates.
Though there is little scholarship stemming from China on this topic, recognized
international scholarship often rebukes Chinese censorship when comparing its
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boundaries on free expression to those existing in other countries. Two recent studies,
compiled by Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders respectively, highlight the
detriments of censorship by lowly ranking Chinese citizens’ political and civil liberties,
as well as freedom of expression. Freedom House posits that, though China has
historically monitored Internet content, President Xi Jinping’s claim of the office in 2012
led to tightened regulation, restricted social movements, and inhibited flow of expression
on social media platforms (2018). Similarly, the World Press Freedom Index by
Reporters Without Borders asserts that the president has increasingly enforced policies
that utilize China’s encompassing technology to censor and control the flow of
information through printed and mobile news, thus restricting the state’s unencumbered
expression (2018).
To explore the complex interpersonal climates in China, Freedom House first
examines the state’s governing processes, finding that Chinese citizens have little to no
political rights in modern society. For example, the current head of the government and
national legislative representatives were not elected through free and fair elections;
rather, elections are continuously left to the discretion and investigation of the Chinese
Communist Party leadership, and candidates with necessary prerequisites are often
bribed, coerced, or forced off the ballot. Similarly, dissenting individuals or groups who
desire to organize different political parties, or more drastically, to overthrow China’s
one-party system, may be silenced or punished with incarceration.
As power is increasingly consolidated in the hands of prominent party leaders,
Chinese citizens and independent media have the ability to express their curiosities
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regarding the validity of the regime’s control according to the nation’s Constitution;
however, the state’s feedback and reactions are infrequently transparent. For example,
party officials have recently resisted to disclosing budgets at federal, provincial, and local
levels and have incarcerated citizens joining in collective action to challenge the regime’s
ambiguity. Moreover, individuals theoretically have the ability to question and even
speak out against the regime, but those who choose this course of action should be
prepared to face potential consequences or punishments.
Individuals and groups additionally face limitations in their ability to relocate
their homes abroad or to other areas of the country and to gather in strikes and protests.
Though these actions are lawfully permitted, many assemblies, especially those
motivated by forces other than the government, realistically do not occur without
government approval. Not only can Chinese regulations hinder citizens from relocating,
but censorship in China has also prevented foreign individuals and organizations from
spreading messages in the mainland. Violating the status quo of regulation often results in
consequences; for example, Reporters Without Borders’ summary of China’s Internet
regulation mentions individuals detained for making objectionable comments or sharing
dissidents’ posts that may be undesirable to the regime (2018). As China’s online
presence grows through both mobile news outlets and social media platforms, the study
cites that more than 50 journalists and bloggers are currently living in uninhabitable
conditions for defying the regime’s regulatory rules.
Reporters Without Borders takes these factors into account when calculating the
World Press Freedom Index to rank each country’s freedom of expression, which also
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assesses pluralism of opinions in media, independence of news and information outlets,
self-censorship from netizens or from Internet service providers, existing legislation that
restricts or encourages information-sharing, transparency of governing bodies and service
providers, infrastructure involved in circulating information, and the level of abuses or
violence. The indicators are scored individually and are entered into formulas that
produce grades ranging from zero to 100, with 100 being the worst. China’s score for
2018 is 78.29, which is an increase of 0.63 points from the previous year. Out of the 180
countries studied by Reporters Without Borders, 20 nations are categorized as “very
bad,” including China, which ranks 176 out 180. Similarly, the OpenNet Initiative
classified the regime’s censorship as “pervasive” in political spheres and “substantial”
regarding social language (MacKinnon, 2008, p. 37).
From these comprehensive studies it is can be determined that the authoritarian
regime’s policies expand past the parameters of cyberspace and contribute to the greater
restrictive social and political climates spanning China’s borders. This trend has existed
long before the inception of today’s People’s Republic of China, in which various forms
of regulatory apparatuses have extensively limited the freedom of expression in
comparison to the rest of the world, even as Internet access in China expands. As social
media has gained momentum in the country within the last couple of decades, different
methods of censorship have evolved in order to keep up with the constant flow of online
information and expression.
In contrast to these viewpoints, Ying posits that the Chinese largely do not abhor
censorship today because it is not new to China, dating back thousands of years prior to
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the current regime when multiple dynasties fought to build an encompassing empire
(2012). Of these Warring States was the “barbarous,” dominant Qin dynasty, from which
then-prince Ying Zheng arose and proclaimed himself the First Emperor of Qin, or Qin
Shi Huang, in the mid-250s BC (Fang, 2015, p. 54). In the year 213 BC, Qin Shi Huang
spearheaded what is now widely known as the first recorded censorship mechanism in
Chinese history, in which hand-written accounts, such as books and historical records,
before his reign were burned “to make the common people ignorant and to see to it that
no one in the empire used the past to criticize the present” (Fang, 2015, p. 55). In addition
to Qin Shi Huang’s book-burning escapade, which prevented unacceptable or sensitive
knowledge from spreading to ordinary citizens, he viciously silenced and punished
scholars who voiced or demonstrated dissent against his reign or policies. To this end, the
First Emperor buried alive hundreds of Confucian scholars who voiced criticism against
his rule--or whom he assumed could potentially voice criticism--in another well-known
campaign. Though these actions are now widely perceived as some “of the most
pernicious and hated acts in all of Chinese history” and evidence of their occurrences is
almost nonexistent, these early acts of censorship began the trend of monitoring the
circulation of information that is prevalent within China’s past and present (Fang, 2015 p.
55).
In order to stimulate his authority and credibility, Qin Shi Huang also flooded
primitive methods of communication with his own praises. With the workings of scholars
and accounts of history now burned, he was free to rewrite history in ways that glorified
his legitimacy as a ruler, which consisted of stories that were often fabricated. For
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example, Qin Shi Huang ordered testaments of his accomplishments, abilities, and
aspirations, such as his strong descendancy and his tales of conquest, to be inscribed on
mountain ridges for all to read (Fang, 2015). To effectively disseminate these claims and
his political orders, he created the first consistent form of writing that removed an
estimated 25% of existing characters and served to “counter all diversity, [eliminate]
obsolete and offensive characters, [simplify] others and [standardize] each and every
one” (Fang, 2015, p. 57). This comprehensive, government-mandated language
reinforced the empire’s authority as it “erased the last excuse for misunderstanding or
misinterpreting the law” (Fang, 2015, p. 57).
While Qin Shi Huang’s mandates were rather extreme, this mindset of controlling
content with the potential for circulation remained prevalent among Chinese leaders well
into the Song Dynasty, which ascended to power in the year 960 AD (Ying, 2012). When
movable type was invented in the 1040s during the Song reign, literature and expression
flourished at exponential rates, to which leaders began to implement rudimentary
censorship mechanisms that guided and limited their publication and circulation. These
early regulations were “designed simply for the government’s benefit” and ultimately
provided the inspiration for censorship policy in the dynasties to come based on the ideas
of protecting the state’s interests in sharing information and enforcing state security
through surveillance (Ying, 2012, p. 65). These policies were later expanded, notably in
the Qing Dynasty beginning in 1644, in which the increasing ability for printing to
connect people was viewed as “potentially subversive and to be feared” (Ying, 2012, p.
65). Resulting from this growing opinion, more books were banned, specific words were
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prohibited, and scholars--and sometimes their families--were killed for publishing
undesirable content that may have contained as much as one offensive word.
Nearly 300 years later, the Nationalist Party attempted to gain total control over
individual and group expression. Though this group wanted the public to think they
would receive democratic civil liberties, such as freedom of publication, that were
promised by the previously-overthrown revolution led by Sun Yat-sen, the Nationalist
Party actually enforced greater regulatory laws (Ying, 2012). In reality, the party
suppressed political opposition and created the requirement for content providers to
register with the state. Still later, when the People’s Republic of China was established in
1949 under the leadership of a communist regime, Mao Zedong’s government almost
completely controlled the daily actions of Chinese individuals, groups, organizations and
businesses “disguised by nationalism and Mao’s mythic image” (Ying, 2012, p. 66).
Today, it is often said in international scholarship that President Xi Jinping is
increasing regulations to make the Great Firewall taller than ever before. The current
regime has expanded its censorship apparatus in a number of ways; for example, the
leadership is creating technological advancements through which social media can be
better monitored, private information can be easily accessed, and online communication
can be frequently observed (Forbidden, 2018, p. 4). The regime has also legally expanded
the regulatory policies that define modern communication, thereby giving leaders a
broader scope in which to operate. Lastly, the president is attempting to garner
ideological support for cyber sovereignty, a national viewpoint positing that it is the
“state’s sovereign right to shape and control the online space within its borders, including
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through its own determination of what constitutes harmful or unwelcome speech”
(Forbidden, 2018, p. 17). This framework would justify the concepts behind centralized
censorship into almost every sector netizens’ daily lives, which is already being seen with
the rise of social media platforms. However, as a result of China’s long, developing
history with censorship and content regulation, Ying argues that the majority of Chinese
citizens do not challenge the social media surveillance that occurs today (2012).
Censorship has always existed in order to paint a positive picture of the regime.
Since the most rudimentary forms of censorship, however, the methodologies of
publication surveillance have become less drastic. For example, there has been a shift
from holistically destroying forms of expression to creating today’s blockades or partial
filters of content that can still be accessed through purchasing virtual private networks or
using various circumvention methods. Therefore, undesirable content certainly may be
difficult to access, but it is not completely gone forever, as in centuries past. Rather than
existing purely to withhold information from citizens, today’s fragmentation of
censorship is likely in response to the growing power and capability of netizens to
generate reformative conversations. Though methods of censorship are diversifying due
to the expansion of the Internet, content regulation is nothing new to the Chinese, who
have experienced some forms of censorship since the first unifying governmental
presence in China thousands of years ago.
Netizens
Since social media censorship in China is a potentially sensitive topic, existing
research and theories based on the firsthand opinions of Chinese citizens on different
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facets of this subject is rather limited. In attempt to investigate and understand the
attitudes and viewpoints of Chinese citizens on the state’s censorship apparatuses, a brief
survey consisting of various qualitative and quantitative questions was created and
executed by the author of this thesis. Consequently and most importantly, this survey was
created to contribute research to the field directly from Chinese netizens, rather than from
the regime or from international scholars.
Methodology
The survey was administered in two separate environments. In the first session,
eight students enrolled in a college in Beijing, The People’s Republic of China’s capital
city with population of roughly 21.5 million, were visiting the University of Mississippi
for two weeks as participants of an educational program, and they had the option to fill
out the printed surveys by hand. These eight surveys were administered in a classroom
setting on the University of Mississippi campus in the presence of an instructor on
January 18, 2019. Though every student could speak and write in English, the questions
were individually read aloud by the author of this thesis to best ensure effective
communication. The author remained present before, during, and after the entire survey
session to answer any questions, such as term clarification or topical inquiries about the
research in general. Each participant had his or her own printed survey and returned it to
the author upon completion, which took around 30 minutes on average.
In the second session, the author emailed the survey to a Chinese student seeking
an undergraduate degree at the University of Mississippi on January 24, 2019. The
student volunteered to share the survey with other Chinese students in Oxford, a college
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town in North Mississippi with a population of nearly 24,000. Each student is seeking a
degree at the University of Mississippi and has been enrolled in the institution for at least
one semester. Because the author could not be physically present for these eight online
surveys, the author placed an emphasis on utilizing her provided phone number and email
address should the participants have any questions about their responses or the research
in general. By January 29, 2019, the student had responded with eight voluntary surveys
that were completed by Chinese students at the University of Mississippi.
The untimed survey, consisting of fifteen questions, was approved by the
University of Mississippi’s Institutional Review Board and was completed by sixteen
total Chinese students. An informational cover sheet outlined the details of the survey,
and the contents of the document are summarized in this paragraph. The students were
assured a high degree of confidentiality, in which only their ages would be recorded, and
any other identifying information, such as their personal names, genders, or the names of
their universities, would be omitted due to the potential sensitivity of the subject matter.
Because of the students’ anonymity, no financial, economic, or personal risks for taking
the survey were foreseeable. No form of compensation was granted for taking this
survey. Furthermore, each student was made aware of his or her right to skip questions
and the freedom to withdraw from the survey at any time, which no student did.
The survey is comprised of two sections that were designed to determine the
opinions, experiences, behaviors, and preferences of Chinese netizens regarding social
media and censorship. As previously mentioned, participants were only asked to provide
their ages, and no other identifying information was recorded. The following six
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questions were open-ended and qualitative, which allowed participants to freely write or
type their own responses based on individual perceptions, emotions, and viewpoints. In
this section, respondents were asked to describe their viewpoints on censorship and
explain their interactions with social media. The latter nine questions allowed participants
to express their responses through comparable quantitative methods, such as selecting a
number on a Likert scale, choosing a letter in multiple choice, or selecting numerous
options that might apply to them. By answering the final questions, participants analyzed
the impacts censorship has on themselves as private individuals and their surrounding
society. The complete list of interview questions is included in Appendix I.
Though this study provides insight into the ways in which Chinese netizens view
social media censorship, various weaknesses of the survey must be highlighted in order to
provide a transparent analysis of data. The survey is first limited due to the small sample
size of survey participants, as sixteen individuals may not accurately provide a holistic
representation of hundreds of millions of Chinese netizens. The survey is also limited in
that the sixteen participants are fairly young, with the vast majority of respondents’ ages
ranging from nineteen to twenty-two years old, and the two outlier ages, twenty-six and
twenty-nine, could still provide rather youthful perspectives on the topic. In addition to
their shared youth, the participants in this survey are all educated members of society
with the individual abilities to participate in postsecondary scholarship programs at
accredited universities. Since the basic demographics of this small population are
relatively similar, viewpoints and responses from these individuals have the potential to
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significantly differ from other Chinese netizens, such as older generations or less
educated individuals.
Despite the study’s apparent weaknesses, however, the results from this survey
reveal viewpoints directly from netizens on a topic about which research is severely
limited due to its potentially dangerous, sensitive nature. Therefore, this data can serve as
a microcosm of the greater opinions on censorship that derive from the individuals who
use social media most as revealed in the literature review: young, educated Chinese
citizens. This group of people is so influential that the Chinese government views them as
opinion leaders with expression to be harnessed, stemming from their unique ability to
sway the stances, actions, and emotions of others purely through social media platforms.
As a result of this group’s power on the Internet, responses from these sixteen young,
educated individuals can offer critical insight on how the concept of censorship is
currently received by netizens and what the future relationship between Internet users and
censorship may look like as this prominent population grows older.
In order to analyze the data from the sixteen surveys, each participant’s responses
were recorded in a word processing document. The individual pieces of feedback were
organized by question, with responses from the Chinese citizens who temporarily
travelled to Mississippi grouped consecutively, immediately followed by the responses
from the Chinese students enrolled at the University of Mississippi. Significant
differences and common ties between responses were recorded in order to detect
comprehensive themes across the primary research.
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Analysis
After describing the methodology behind the survey as well as its strengths and
weaknesses, an analysis of the survey responses gathered from the sixteen Chinese
netizens is provided. This analysis will first holistically analyze the data to reveal
attitudes and viewpoints on social media censorship from the perspective of the young,
educated members of Chinese society in general. However, this examination will also go
a step further to intricately study responses from the students who permanently live in
China as compared to those who are enrolled full-time at the University of Mississippi.
This more specific analysis will highlight differences that might exist based on living
within the regime’s jurisdiction and, conversely, living on the other side of the world in a
nation where freedom of expression is highly defended. An overview of the survey
results follows this introductory paragraph.
The participants are active communicators, with eleven of the sixteen individuals
reporting that they use more than one social media platform at least sometimes. Though
there are a couple of outlier platforms, such as Douban and WhatsApp, each participant
asserts that he or she mainly uses QQ, WeChat, Sina Weibo, or a combination of these
three platforms in China. On these platforms, all sixteen of the survey participants are
likely to utilize a common variety of functions, which includes sharing photos and
videos, making payments, reading the news, posting status updates, sending voice
recordings, creating microblogs, and connecting with friends, family, and strangers alike.
However, the number of respondents who reportedly use social media for governmental
purposes is staunchly lower than those who use it for general communication. For
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example, five individuals say they use social media to discuss politics or current culture,
five use it to engage in debates, four use it to follow government accounts, and three use
it to contact government leadership. Regardless of the motives behind netizens’ social
media usage, the Chinese government is prevalent across social media through its diverse
regulatory apparatuses.
When discussing the general topic of censorship in China, all sixteen individuals
assert that content regulation certainly exists on current social media platforms.
Respondents offer a wealth of reasons to support their assertions, such as netizens’
inability to access Facebook, Google, or Instagram in China, the evident trend of post
deletions, the publishing restrictions for content providers, and the intensifying
governmental inspection in response to the rapid growth of social media. The majority of
the respondents furthermore believe that not only does censorship exist, but it rightfully
should exist on social media. Thirteen individuals posit that censorship has many societal
benefits, such as filtering out rumors and fake news, preventing national terror,
prohibiting brainwashing, and protecting children from inappropriate content, that
warrant its existence. However, three respondents assert that social media content should
not be censored because its implementation disregards individual freedom and privacy.
Participants were then asked their perceptions of the primary function of social
media censorship within China’s borders, to which seven individuals answered that they
were unaware of its purpose. On the opposite end of the spectrum, other individuals
responded that censorship exists mainly to prevent negative or potentially hurtful
information, such as content pertaining to terrorism, drugs, violence, or pornography,
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from reaching citizens. Another viewpoint holds that censorship acts more in the state’s
interest than that of the people. To this point, two participants answered that the social
media censorship apparatus exists to uphold the goals of the state by promoting national
unity and by protecting the communist ideology from foreign influence.
Though just over half of the respondents could provide reasoning for the concept
of content regulation, the participants allude that society is widely cognizant of
censorship. Six individuals respond that censorship is often discussed in China, while
seven report that it is sometimes a topic of conversation. Two participants say it is not
often discussed, and one says it is never discussed. From this sample population, three
individuals relay that they had various personal experiences with censorship, citing
instances of inability to access Instagram and Twitter in China, as well as automatic post
deletions and direct banning of content. Though thirteen individuals reported no history
of personal censorship interactions, one of these participants mentioned that he or she
knows content regulation is a reality for members of surrounding communities. Many of
the respondents’ answers centered around these trends of censorship when asked about
improvements they would like to see on Internet platforms.
In response to this query, five participants gave answers alluding to a desire for
less social media censorship. One of these respondents suggests the best improvement to
social media would be less censorship verbatim, and two other participants mention that
they wish information would not be controlled by influential formal leaders of the
communist party. Similarly, another individual states that he or she wants the government
to let netizens know the truth about certain topics, rather than censor information across
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platforms that is deemed unfavorable to the regime. Such bureaucratic censorship of
social media may skew content largely in support of the regime’s leadership and policies,
which leads one participant to desire the preservation of authenticity and diversity of
information, rather than a one-sided flow of opinions and conversations. In contrast to
these responses, two individuals believe improvements to social media center around the
enforcement of censorship. For example, one respondent believes the social media
landscape would benefit from increased detection and deletion of accounts, while another
participant wishes viewing and positing of sensitive information could be restricted by
age level.
While the previously discussed individuals believe improvements to social media
stem from less censorship or the maintenance of censorship respectively, three
participants respond that social media could benefit from the increased personal freedoms
of netizens. For example, one respondent wishes for more freedom of speech, while the
two others desire more personal reason, judgement, and fairness across platforms. In
response to the same question, three other respondents believe the structure and
operations of social media must improve to create more organized, efficient
communications. The final three individuals offer vague improvements to social media,
such as wishing for “lots” of changes or “more positive” content.
Though every member of this netizen group acknowledges the existence of
governmental censorship of social media, quantitative data reveals that individuals offer
different viewpoints regarding its effects on posted content. Eight participants say that
censorship imposes numerous changes on the information received across Internet

78

platforms, while four say there are no changes, and another four say there are only
minimal changes to content. As a result of these perceived changes, individuals also view
the reliability of information on social media differently. For example, ten individuals
believe censorship makes social media content somewhat reliable, two say it is mostly
reliable, two say it is mostly unreliable, one says it is reliable, and one says it is very
unreliable.
Because these individuals are all plugged into social media to perform a multitude
of functions, the respondents have various viewpoints regarding online activism. Seven
participants have a neutral attitude toward commenting about social media censorship on
an online platform, while three say they are likely to make such a comment. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, four people say they are not likely to comment on
censorship, and two say the never would. When asked about the likelihood of voicing
criticism about the regime on social media, six were neutral, while two were likely and
another two were extremely likely to criticize the regime online. However, one individual
reported to be unlikely to voice criticism, while five say they never would.
The responses from these quantitative questions, as well as from the previous
qualitative inquiries, culminate to shape the participants’ opinions toward China’s
censorship of social media content. Six individuals are indifferent toward censorship,
while three like and two strongly like the government’s regulatory apparatuses. In
contrast to these opinions, four participants dislike and one strongly dislikes social media
censorship. Consequently, the participants can loosely be grouped into thirds, in which
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one group is indifferent toward social media censorship, one third generally dislikes it,
and the other third generally likes it.
While a general analysis of the survey results certainly reveals useful information
regarding social media censorship, various themes emerge from a deeper comparison of
the data from the Beijing students and the University of Mississippi students. For
example, the two groups of Chinese individuals find common ground in that they largely
perceive social media content to be somewhat reliable, which is likely partly due to their
assertions that censorship imposes numerous changes upon what is posted online.
Additionally, the participants would agree that the topic of social media censorship is
occasionally discussed in China, rather than being completely taboo or, conversely, a
common conversation starter.
Similarities can also be detected when analyzing the social media platforms used
by both groups of participants. For example, even though netizens of diverse
backgrounds in America have the opportunity to create accounts on any Western Internet
platform, such as Facebook or Twitter, the Chinese students seeking degrees at the
University of Mississippi still predominantly utilize Chinese social media outlets over
international platforms. The majority of respondents from both Beijing and Mississippi
respond that they perform similar functions on these platforms, like sharing photos and
videos, posting status updates, connecting with people they know, and making payments.
However, though these functions can be completed on Western platforms, only one
respondent mentions using Instagram at least sometimes. It can be concluded from this
data that these Chinese netizens are looking for function, community, and
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interconnectivity rather than the ability to access a specific platform that is restricted in
China.
Though valid similarities certainly exist between the respondents from Beijing
and Mississippi, differences between the two groups are evident based on their respective
cultural surroundings. For example, in the United States, the freedoms of speech and
press have historically been supported by the people and have been upheld and reinforced
by the courts in notable decisions like Yates v. United States a nd New York Times
Company v. United States. Perhaps this expressive culture is why the Chinese students
enrolled at the University of Mississippi offer responses that symbolize such personal
freedoms; for example, these students are more likely to discuss common culture, to
engage in debates, to follow government accounts, to contact government leadership, and
are less likely to desire to be anonymous on social media.
Furthermore, the survey reveals that Chinese respondents from the University of
Mississippi perceive the regime’s censorship to be more prevalent across the social media
landscape than do the respondents from Beijing. Where seven out of eight University of
Mississippi participants say censorship is common within China’s borders, five Beijing
participants say it is occasional, two find it common, and one finds censorship extremely
common within the nation’s cyberspace. Just as individuals from the University of
Mississippi are more likely to put censorship on a larger national scale, so respondents
from this state were more likely to provide a reason for the primary function of
censorship, as previously discussed, whereas six of the Beijing participants gave answers
such as “I don’t know,” “I am not familiar with it,” or “I have no idea.”
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The Beijing participants’ responses generally reflect more support for censorship
of sensitive and inappropriate content as compared to the Chinese students enrolled
full-time at the University of Mississippi. Though three Beijing participants did respond
that social media should not be censored due to lack of personal freedoms, there is a
greater number of Beijing individuals who like or strongly like censorship than
Mississippi students, as derived from the quantitative data. In addition, even though the
majority of individuals from Beijing are neutral about publishing comments regarding
social media censorship, they are less likely to voice criticism of the regime on social
media than are the respondents attending school in Mississippi. Such loyalty to the
regime from the Beijing netizens may correlate with the absence of any of these
respondents revealing a personal experience with censorship.
An analysis of these surveys offers insight into the trends, opinions, and
viewpoints of young, educated Chinese netizens—the demographic that most often uses
social media. From these results, it can be concluded that these Chinese netizens openly
acknowledge the existence of China’s diverse censorship mechanisms on social media.
Though certain platforms may be inaccessible and specific posts may be blocked,
netizens are loyal to Chinese platforms that allow them to perform universal
communication functions. Few respondents assert that social media should be less
censored because individuals deserve to have their own freedoms of privacy and speech
respected, not because Chinese netizens feel they are receiving inadequate information or
incomplete access to the Internet. As a result of these trends, the surveyed netizens
generally support the regime’s censorship apparatuses because they value the regime’s
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efforts of preventing sensitive, inaccurate, or dangerous information from negatively
impacting members of society and can still express their voices to their satisfaction on
other platforms.
From analyzing the regime’s historical approach to censorship and netizens’
responses to it, it is evident that censorship has become an almost integral part of society
with which the majority of netizens have become accustomed. Because of the ways in
which content regulation has immersed itself in the daily lives of Chinese citizens well
before the People’s Republic of China was even established, it can be concluded that
netizens are generally satisfied with or at least indifferent toward censorship’s filtrations
of inappropriate content since it does offer some benefit toward society. To dig even
deeper into this topic, an analysis is provided in the following section to shed light on the
subject of whether or not censorship should exist in the years to come and the
implications it may cause.

83

PART SIX: ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSION
As one of the first countries to seriously invest in intensive Internet censorship
mechanisms, China continues its centuries-long history of being a world leader on this
front. Because content regulation has certainly brought various benefits to the state, such
as previously discussed increased e-commerce, political cohesion, and social order, other
countries may be inclined to follow in China’s footsteps and institute forms of regulatory
apparatuses within their own borders. This concluding section will overview some
reasons that the ideals behind censorship may potentially be adopted in other countries, as
well as the implications content regulation may impose on these nations and China itself.
Following this analysis, this section will discuss whether or not censorship presents a
problem for Chinese society, in which the current balance between expression and order
could waver in the future. Improvements and corrections to the regime’s current
censorship apparatus will be provided in this section, as well as suggestions for future
research on this multifaceted topic.
Though Chinese censorship is often contested by mainstream scholarship, there
are certain altruistic ideals behind content regulation that may be appealing to other
countries, causing extensive regulation to potentially spread past China’s borders. One of
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these ideals follows that the screening of unacceptable content prevents harmful
information from negatively affecting citizens. For example, the ability to filter out false
information of domestic or foreign descent could generally be beneficial for society,
especially in response to the current international trend of fighting fake political news.
Following this mindset, the removal of inaccurate or fraudulent claims from cyberspace
would put greater focus on information that is actually reliable, thus likely creating a
better-informed, more patriotic citizenry. Similarly, the sifting of Internet content could
reduce national security risks by cracking down on cyberterrorism that spreads through
viruses and malware. By filtering content that is deliberately intended to cause social
panic, regulating bodies could play an important role in maintaining peace and cohesion
if a disaster were rumored. In addition to preventing the spread of fake news and
cyberterrorism, filtering online information could also protect younger populations from
sensitive information, such as pornographic or violent material, that is almost completely
accessible in countries without Internet borders. Moreover, the ideals behind censorship
and partial screening of content may be adopted by other countries because it sends a
strong message to both other nations and its own citizens regarding what the country will
and will not tolerate.
China and other countries that may choose to implement similar censorship
apparatuses will have to face certain implications of content regulation, starting with
discovering where to draw the line between the free flow of opinions and content control.
For instance, other governments may elect to utilize censorship to filter only national
security threats or sexual content, which seems at least somewhat altruistic, but they then
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must decide where censorship should stop, if it should at all. Furthermore, the large-scale
spread of censorship could result in a continuous wave of information filtration stemming
from other authoritarian regimes that might even spread to dismantle democracies, or on
the other hand, create tensions between countries with free flows of information. Such
tensions could--and do currently--present themselves in the forms of barriers to trade,
scholarship, and communication with the outside world.
As a result of these implications from censorship, it is necessary to question
whether or not the current balance between online expression and social order, as well as
government superiority and human rights, in present-day China is problematic. Though
the authoritarian regime may justify Internet censorship through its history entrenched
with benefits it brings society, such as filtering out violent or pornographic content or
creating domestic e-commerce sites and social media platforms that increase the nation’s
ability to be self-serving, Chinese citizens are realistically living in information darkness,
in which almost a billion users’ innate abilities to make objectively informed personal
decisions are limited. The restraints placed on communication and research are
unacceptable and detrimental to growth, as the largest and potentially most influential
netizen base in the world is unaware of the breadth of information surrounding them and
is blocked from entering a global conversation. The withdrawal of ideas, thoughts, news,
and events from cyberspace, each with the unborn potential to advance and diversify
Chinese society, is an issue because censorship provides netizens with only partial access
to information, which cannot be considered the complete truth. As censorship tightens
under the current leadership while Internet users increasingly desire the privacy and
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freedom with which they can speak their minds, this separation from truth will likely
cause a break in China’s current balance between netizens’ expression and governmental
order.
As a result of the foreseeable disruption to the current Internet equilibrium, it is
logical to conclude that censorship should not be a part of Chinese society forever,
responding to the influx of netizens who challenge the substantial communication and
information standards set by the regime. To this end, covering up netizens who are brave
enough to be vocal now will not last forever; in the years to come, they will likely begin
demanding change in magnitudes that cannot be ignored or subdued. Just as censorship
has holistically become less extreme with time, ranging from the complete destruction of
books and records to today’s partial banning of content that can still be accessed on the
web outside of the country’s borders, censorship should phase out, or at least become less
extensive, as netizens become more outspoken and influential.
Though extensive censorship should not be a permanent facet of Chinese society,
the current balance between expression and order is likely to continue in the immediate
future. This present-day equilibrium can be corrected and improved by genuinely
listening to the voices of netizens, rather than blatantly silencing or hiding them, as it
should never be ignored that many netizens do genuinely advocate for regulation while
others oppose it. Returning to the primary survey feedback from the sixteen Chinese
netizens, for example, many individuals support some ideals behind censorship but wish
it could be scaled down to respect their personal freedoms, such as leaving private
conversations private and giving users more reason and judgment to acquire diverse
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information within their social media experiences. Netizens in this survey also suggest
age level restrictions on potentially sensitive, graphic, or explicit information but support
the wholesale deletion of fake accounts and fraudulent news articles. In general, however,
as most Chinese netizens are aware of censorship and the ways in which it impacts their
daily lives, the regime needs to increase the reliability of information Internet users
receive. To this end, the government should increase discussion of social media and
Internet censorship in China, not only clarifying what is acceptable to post or publish and
what is not, but also thoroughly explaining and offering justification as to why content is
being censored from reaching netizens.
To build on the research and assertions presented in this thesis, succeeding
scholarship should focus on further detecting the viewpoints of Chinese netizens and the
regime toward the future of censorship on social media. Research stemming directly from
Chinese netizens is the only way to determine their true attitudes on the topic because
Western literature is likely going to be biased toward increasing the personal freedoms of
expression, privacy, and human rights on the Internet. To further contribute to this field, a
potential study of anonymous anecdotal evidence of netizens’ censorship experiences,
ranging from the Great Firewall or individual post deletions, would be useful in
determining their understanding of what happened and why they thought it happened.
However, issues with conducting this research mainly center around censorship itself,
which will likely block content of this nature from publication or very likely intimidate
Chinese netizens from sharing their viewpoints in the first place.
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Furthermore, research that implements feedback from the Chinese regime itself,
such as interviews with members of the government on any level who can explain what
happens when content is regulated and for what reason, would increase transparency and
international comprehension on the topic of censorship. As in the case with netizens,
however, the sensitivity of this topic may likely result in hesitancy or extreme opposition
to participate in such a study. In general, since there is such limited existing literature in
this field, any scholarship that shines light on a single facet of the content regulation
apparatus would be useful in better understanding the relationship between Chinese
netizens and social media censorship.
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APPENDIX
Interview Questions for Sixteen Chinese Netizens
Age: _____
Please answer questions #1-6 based on your own opinion and experiences. There is no
right or wrong answer.
1. Do you think there is social media censorship in China? Why or why not?
2. Do you think social media should or should not be censored? Why or why not?
3. What do you think is the primary function of social media censorship in China?
4. Do you have a personal experiences with censorship on a social media platform? If so,
what happened?
5. What improvements would you like to see on social media platforms?
6. Write any social media platforms that you use at least sometimes in China.
Please answer survey questions #7-15.
7. Which of the following functions do you perform on social media? Put “X” by
multiple
choices if needed.
___ Share photos and/or videos
___ Post status updates
___ Send voice recordings
___ Make payments
___ Play games
___ To be anonymous
___ Connect with people you know
___ Connect with people you do not know
___ Create blogs/microblogs
___ Read the news
___ Engage in debates
___ Discuss politics or current culture
___ Contact government leadership
___ Follow government accounts
___ Other (please describe here):
8. Rank the reliability of information you feel you receive on Chinese social media
platforms. Please choose one answer.
1
2
3
4
5
Very unreliable Mostly unreliable Somewhat reliable Mostly reliable
Reliable
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9. How much, if any, do you believe that censorship changes the information you receive
on social media? Please choose one answer.
1.
2.
3.
4.

No changes
Minimal changes
Numerous changes
Extreme changes

10. How often are you exposed to international social media outlets in China (ex.
Facebook, Instagram, Twitter)?
1. Never
2. Occasionally
3. Often
11. What is your opinion toward China’s censorship of social media?
1
Strongly dislike

2
Dislike

3
Indifferent

4
Like

5
Strongly like

12. How common is censorship across the Chinese social media landscape?
1
Nonexistent

2
Not common

3
Occasional

4
Common

5
Extremely common

13. How often is social media censorship discussed in China?
1
Never

2
Not often

3
Sometimes

4
Often

5
Extremely often

14. How likely are you to voice any criticism about the regime on Chinese social media
platforms (ex. policies, leaders)?
1
Never

2
Not likely

3
Neutral

4
Likely

5
Extremely likely

15. How likely are you to comment about social media censorship on a social media
platform?
1
Never

2
Not likely

3
Neutral

4
Likely

5
Extremely likely

